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Summary 
This paper makes a comparative analysis on to the legality of unilateral refusal to deal 
IPR as a dominant undertaking in EU and US. In particular the paper examines the 
circumstances in which the judicial bodies in EU and United States will be willing to 
order a mandatory license of IPR under the relevant anticompetition/antitrust policies, 
such as article 102 TFEU under EU and the Sherman Act section 2 in the US.   
 
As a starting point the paper explains the default position of whether there is a general 
obligation to deal for dominant undertakings. Having concluded that there is not, the 
paper then goes into explaining the specific legal test implemented by the judiciary in 
Europe to determine when extraordinary circumstances that would justify such a 
compulsory order might exist. The paper then goes on to examine if there is a 
requisite test in the US that determines where the judiciary would be willing to order a 
compulsory license under antitrust policies. 
 
The paper subsequently highlights the key differences in the judiciary approach 
between US and EU Courts, before the paper goes on to comment which judiciary has 
the better approach for the benefit of consumer welfare.  
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1.	  INTRODUCTION	  
1.1.	  Background	  
The primary purpose of intellectual property law is to incentivize innovation by 
rewarding intellectual property owners, exclusive monopoly rights over their property 
for a limited period of time. On the other hand, the rationale of antitrust and 
competition Law is to try and curb monopolistic tendencies of dominant undertakings 
in order to create rivalry between competitors in the market. Instinctively it would 
seem that the protection of IPR fundamentally clashes with that of competition law. 
But such an assumption might be premature, as ultimately the raison d'être for both 
areas of laws is the overarching goal of enhancing consumer welfare.  
 
It is undeniable however, that there is some inherent tension between the two strands 
of law. While both areas of law try to achieve the same goal, the manner in which the 
goal is reached is through different theoretical emphases.1 Competition law focuses 
on an ex post evaluation where the theory relies on allocative efficiency2 to ensure 
lower price and more efficient production of goods. On the other hand, IPR value 
dynamic efficiency, evaluating the market effect from an ex ante perspective to ensure 
that adequate protection safeguards IPR owners’ incentive to innovate. In turn this 
should theoretically lead to new and better quality products.3 
 
In this debate regarding the potential conflict between IPR and competition law, 
refusal to license IPR sticks out like a sore thumb. This controversy stems from the 
fact that an order for a mandatory license of IPR, forces the owner to grant access to a 
third party, often a competitor. This is in conflict with the very ‘heart of the IP 
owner’s right to exclude’.4  
 
It is posited that it is not a solution to nullify one area of the law in order to ensure the 
preservation of the other. Either extreme end of the spectrum could ultimately cause a 
                                                
1	  Kelvin	  Hiu	  Fai	  Kwok,	  ‘A	  New	  Approach	  to	  Resolving	  Refusal	  to	  License	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  
Disputes’	  [2001]	  34(2)	  World	  Competition	  263.	  	  
2	  Allocative	  efficiency	  occurs	  where	  production	  reaches	  an	  optimal	  point	  where	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  
producing	  an	  additional	  unit	  will	  be	  equal	  to	  the	  marginal	  benefit	  that	  is	  gained	  by	  the	  consumer.	  	  
3	  Kwok,	  supra	  note	  1.	  	  
4	  Ariel	  Katz	  and	  Paul-­‐Erik	  Veel,	  ‘Beyond	  Refusal	  to	  Deal:	  A	  Cross-­‐Atlantic	  View	  of	  Copyright,	  
Competition	  and	  Innovation	  Policies’	  [2013]	  79(1)	  Antitrust	  Law	  journal	  143.	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net result detrimental to consumer welfare. If the law always gave competition law 
preference over IPR, such a stance would discourage companies from investing in 
research and development. In turn this would lead to the unwanted result of decreased 
innovation. The alternative is equally undesirable. Excluding anticompetition entirely 
could lead to dominant undertakings growing too comfortable with their monopolistic 
position and the lack of competition could create higher prices for the consumer. Even 
worse, the IPR owners could use their right of exclusivity to bar competitors from 
creating new and improved products. In either situation the net result would decrease 
consumer benefit rather than increase it. This is where mandatory court-ordered 
compulsory license could possibly mitigate such anticompetitive effects. Allowing 
third parties access to the dominant undertaking’s IPR could in some circumstances 
foster competition. The agreement of both jurisdictions is that competition law should 
only intervene when the ultimate net benefit to consumers outweighs the benefits of 
granting rights to the IPR owner. However, where this balance should be struck is 
contentious.  
1.2.	  Purpose	  
The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. The primary purpose is to try and delimit the 
circumstances when the judiciary is prepared to order a compulsory licensing for IPR 
in both EU and US through the use of anticompetition policies.5 This thesis will 
hopefully offer a comprehensive comparison between the two systems, highlighting 
the key differences as well as similarities in the legal approaches of the courts. As a 
secondary goal this thesis will try to present a compelling argument as to why the 
European approach is preferable to its reluctant American counterpart.  
 
There is great relevance to this research topic. Many dominant undertakings that 
could potentially be subject to competition law wish to conduct business in both 
jurisdictions. Where the IPR in question have international scope and benefits from 
protection in both continents, it is vital that the firms are aware of the radical 
difference between the two systems before deciding whether they should license their 
                                                
5	  This	  dissertation	  will	  use	  the	  terms	  antitrust,	  anticompetition	  and	  competition	  law	  interchangeably.	  
Antitrust	  is	  the	  correct	  legal	  term	  most	  commonly	  used	  in	  the	  US,	  whereas	  anticompetition	  and	  
competition	  law	  is	  primarily	  used	  in	  the	  EU.	  As	  far	  as	  possible	  the	  terms	  will	  therefore	  be	  used	  in	  
conjunction	  with	  the	  relevant	  legal	  system	  during	  the	  discussion.	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IPR to a third party.6 The issue is therefore of great practical importance to legal 
practitioners and companies alike. Furthermore the EU and US also represent the two 
most mature legal systems regarding both intellectual property law and competition 
law.7 A comparison of these two jurisdictions is therefore of academic interest, due to 
their vastly different attitudes in tackling the issue of compulsory licensing for IPR.  
1.3.	  Delimitation	  
The legal analysis only discusses compulsory licenses made as an anticompetition 
enforcement order. It will not discuss the reasoning behind other circumstances where 
such orders are made. This is because they do not relate to essential facilities doctrine, 
and generally the legal reasoning behind such orders are completely unrelated to the 
subject matter of this dissertation.  
 
Furthermore, TRIPS will not be considered, as the essay is already discussing the 
geographic breadth of two of the world’s largest legal jurisdictions. Furthermore 
TRIPS consideration might not serve to further the discussion on anticompetition 
policy as such matters are not strongly expressed in the TRIPS articles. This 
dissertation does not intend to offer an analysis of interoperability and network effects 
in depth, although the concept will be mentioned briefly in relation to relevant case 
law.  
 
The dissertation will not include an in depth discussion on Standard Essential Patents 
as such patents are already governed by standard-setting organizations. The reason it 
is not included is because with such patents, patent holders have already given a 
commitment to license their patent on FRAND terms, and will be remunerated by any 
licensee. Such cases concern whether or not an SEP holder is allowed to seek 
injunctions against certain willing licensees, rather than whether compulsory access to 
                                                
6	  John	  M.	  Taladay	  and	  James	  N.	  Carlin,	  Jr.	  ‘Compulsory	  Licensing	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Under	  the	  
Competition	  Laws	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  European	  Community’	  [2002]	  10(3)	  Geo.	  Mason	  L.	  Rev.	  
450.	  
7	  Rita	  Coco	  ‘Antitrust	  Liability	  For	  Reufsal	  to	  License	  Intellectual	  Property	  A	  Comparative	  Analysis	  and	  
the	  International	  Setting’	  [2008]	  12	  Marq.	  Intell.	  Prop.	  L.	  Rev	  3.	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the IPR should be granted in the first place. Therefore the recent string of cases for 
smartphones such as Samsung and Motorola8 will not be included in the dissertation.  
1.4.	  Method	  and	  Material	  
This dissertation follows a traditional dogmatic approach that is often used for legal 
academic writing to systemize and properly interpret relevant sources of law.  To do 
so the dissertation makes use of primary sources of law, consisting of EU treaties and 
federal statues in the US. It also makes use of secondary law sources, primarily in the 
form of various case law from both EU and the US. From time to time the discussion 
will also refer to the opinion of AGs in European case law. These comments are not 
binding, but they are useful, as they give a proper context as to how specific legal 
issues should be interpreted. Similarly, certain obiter dicta comments made by US 
judges will be taken into consideration even though they are not binding. Such 
limitations will of course be mentioned where appropriate.  
 
Furthermore, this dissertation makes extensive use of reputable academic opinion 
from various academic journals to carry on the legal discussion. This is because the 
dissertation uses a teleogical method to interpret the law. This means that where there 
are uncertainties as to how the law should be interpreted or applied in practise, the 
author will primarily focus on the intended purpose of the underlying law. In such 
instances, the opinion of academics is highly valuable in helping to deduce the 
intended purpose of the specific provision of law. The academic opinions chosen 
originate from both Europe and America. This was done in order to get a nuanced 
view that represents the contrasting attitudes towards the topic from both sides of the 
Atlantic.   
 
From a structural point of view, this dissertation will begin by separately outlining the 
legal tests that should be followed in Europe and then the US. In regards to uncertain 
areas, where possible, suggestions as to how the area should be interpreted will be 
offered. The dissertation will then focus on the contrasts in the legal stance of both 
jurisdictions and draw a conclusion as to which method is better. This assessment as 
to which is better, is primarily made from the point of view of which method better 
                                                
8	  European	  Commission	  press	  release:	  Commission	  finds	  that	  Motorola	  Mobility	  infringed	  EU	  
competition	  rules	  by	  misusing	  standard-­‐essential	  patents,	  29	  April	  2014.	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serves consumer welfare. The strong focus of consumer welfare is appropriate due to 
the fact that in both legal jurisdictions there is a consensus that the ultimate goal of 
intellectual property law and competition law is to ensure that consumer welfare is 
maximized.  
1.5.	  Outline	  	  
The thesis is structured as follows: It begins by briefly outlining the default position 
that both jurisdictions hold with regards to a dominant undertaking’s obligations to 
deal with its competitors. The thesis then turns to a discussion regarding the European 
stance on compulsory licensing in competition law, and the legal test that has been 
developed through case law. In particular the discussion will depict how the judiciary 
has dealt with the closely related legal principle that is inextricably linked with a 
refusal to deal in IPR; that of the essential facilities doctrine. This is necessary, as it 
will help form an idea of the ideological influences behind the two continents’ 
difference in judicial attitude towards refusals to license IPR. This is followed by a 
similar discussion but in regards to the American stance.  
 
The next part of the dissertation will then delve into a comparison between the two 
jurisdictions’ methods, focusing on the contrasts and similarities between the 
jurisdictions. In particular it will outline the possible underlying legal reasoning that 
might explain the reasons why the two jurisdictions are so different. The discussion 
will with an assessment based on the factors previously discussed in the dissertation 
to determine which stance is preferable and better serves the consumers in the market.  
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2.	  LEGAL	  BACKGROUND	  TO	  COMPETITION	  LAW	  AND	  
INTELLECUAL	  PROPERTY	  PROTECTION	  IN	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  
AND	  THE	  EUROPEAN	  UNION	  
2.1.	  Legal	  Protection	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  
Under the legal system in the United States, intellectual property is afforded statutory 
protection. Copyright is constitutionally guaranteed by the US Copyright Act 1970, 
and patents are similarly protected by the 1970 Patent act. When a patent is granted, it 
is granted on a federal level and applies throughout the United States. Arguably, the 
most important legal right granted to an IPR owner under the patent act is in 
substance to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale or importing 
the patented invention throughout the entire duration of the grant.   
 
The rights of exclusivity granted to intellectual property owners in America are 
identical in substance to those rights granted to IPR owners in European member 
states. However, one fundamental difference between European and American 
Intellectual property law, particularly with regard to patents, is that protection is 
granted by the individual member states. There is no sole governmental body in the 
EU that can grant such protection. The European patent system has not been 
harmonized, and this means that the European Courts do not have the competence to 
question the validity of the protection granted on IPR by individual member states. 
This has led to a principle that the ECJ cannot question the existence of an intellectual 
property, only the way in which it has been exercised.9 In other words, the ECJ is not 
allowed to question member states’ decisions as to the merits of whether an intangible 
asset is worthy of IPR protection. This is subject to the important limitation that when 
an IPR owner exercises his property in a manner that conflicts with interests that are 
protected by the EC treaty, the ECJ will be allowed to intervene.10 In practice, this is 
particularly relevant where the use of IPR is likely to restrict intra-member trade. The 
ECJ will then be able to intervene on the basis that such actions threatens the 
fundamental goal of harmonizing the trade market between member states within the 
union.11 
                                                
9	  Case	  T-­‐76/89,	  ITP	  v.	  Commission	  [1991]	  E.C.R.	  II-­‐575,	  T-­‐69/89	  RTE	  v.	  Commission	  [1991]	  ECR	  II-­‐485	  
10	  Ibid,	  paragraph	  170.	  	  
11	  Joined	  Cases	  54/6	  &	  58/64	  Establissmenets	  Consten	  S.A.R.L.	  v	  Commission	  1966	  E.C.R.	  299.	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It should be noted that the European judiciary’s lack of competence to rule on patents 
might soon change in light of the proposed introduction of a “European patent with 
unitary effect”.12 While no official commencement date has been announced the most 
optimistic projection is for 2016.13 If ratified, any patent granted under the proposed 
European Patent Convention would become a ‘bundle of nationally enforceable 
patents’.14 In other words, such a patent would have the effect of being enforceable in 
all member states while coexisting with national patents similar to the Community 
Trade Mark.15  
2.2.	  Competition	  and	  Antitrust	  	  
For the purposes of competition law, American anti-monopolisation is governed by 
section 2 of the Sherman act, whilst the European equivalent is article 102 TFEU. 
Section 2 of the Sherman act states that it is illegal for any party who commits or 
attempts ‘to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce’ within the 50 states of 
America or with foreign nations.  
 
While the wording is not identical, the sentiment in article 102 TFEU is strikingly 
similar.16 The purpose of the article is to restrict undertakings that hold a dominant 
position in a particular market from abusing its privileged position. 17  More 
specifically it states that ‘Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the internal market […] shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States’.18 It is 
important to note that in neither jurisdiction is the mere act of holding a dominant 
position in itself illegal. In order to attract liability under either regulation there has to 
be behaviour that is considered anticompetitive and restrictive of trade or competition.  
                                                
12	  Mihály	  Ficsor,	  'Coexistence	  of	  national	  patents,	  European	  patents	  and	  patents	  with	  unitary	  effect'	  
[2013]	  14(1)	  ERA	  Forum	  95.	  
13	  Marks	  &	  Clerk,	  'Unitary	  patent:	  on	  course	  for	  2016'	  (Lexology	  2015)	  
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=edc6b5c0-­‐4e37-­‐40ec-­‐a7ae-­‐742248d30301	  accessed	  
26th	  May	  2015.	  
14	  Hiroko	  Yamane,	  Interpreting	  TRIPS:	  Globalisation	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  and	  Access	  to	  
Medicines	  (Bloomsbury	  Publishing,	  2011)	  35.	  
15	  Ficsor,	  supra	  note	  12.	  	  
16	  Coco,	  supra	  note	  7,	  4.	  	  
17	  C-­‐85/76,	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  &.	  Co.	  AG	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461.	  
18	  Article	  102	  TFEU.	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2.3.	  Refusal	  to	  Deal	  and	  Supply	  –	  The	  Default	  Position	  
In both the American and European legal system, the default legal position is that 
there is no general obligation for an undertaking to deal with a third party. This 
remains so, even where the undertaking in question is dominant in the relevant 
market. In America, such authority stems from the Colgate doctrine.19 In this case, the 
Supreme Court famously held that a unilateral decision to refuse to deal would not on 
its own, without any further abuse, trigger a violation of antitrust law provision of the 
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court did however recognize that in rare instances, 
certain refusals to deal could amount to a violation of section 2 of the Sherman act. In 
Europe, a similar default position is held. Once again, there is no general obligation 
for an undertaking to deal on the sole basis that they hold a dominant position in the 
market.20 The starting point in the European Community is that only in exceptional 
circumstances will the court deem that a dominant undertaking has an obligation to 
deal with another party. One such scenario that could persuade the court that a duty 
prevails is if the competitor is a ‘long standing customer’.21 In such a case, the 
dominant undertaking might be obliged to continue to supply.  
 
In Europe, Commercial Solvents22 represents the first ECJ judgment on refusal to 
supply. At the time, Commercial Solvents was the only undertaking on a global scale 
that was capable of supplying Aminobutanol in the adequate quantity that was 
required for the production of the antituberculosis drug. Its only competitor on the 
market for producing the tuberculosis medication was Zoja. When Commercial 
Solvents ceased its previous supply of Aminobutanol to Zoja, it effectively shut out 
its only competitor. As a result Zoja brought a complaint to the Commission alleging 
that Commercial Solvent’s behaviour amounted to an abuse of its dominant position 
in a manner contrary to article 102 TFEU. The court reasoned that such a cessation of 
supply was an abuse of their dominant position. The court began by reiterating that 
there was no general obligation to deal even for dominant undertakings. However, 
where the dominant undertaking had previously supplied to the petitioner this might 
                                                
19	  Colgate	  [United	  States	  v	  Colgate	  &	  Co.	  250	  U.S	  300	  (1919)].	  
20	  Hans	  Henrik	  Lidgard	  ‘Application	  of	  Article	  82	  EC	  to	  Abusive	  Exclusionary	  Conduct’	  [2009]	  4	  
Europarättslig	  tidskrift	  694,	  695.	  
21	  C-­‐27/76,	  United	  Brands	  v	  Commission	  [1978]	  ECR	  207,	  Paragraph	  182.	  
22	  Joined	  Cases	  6	  &	  7/73	  Commercial	  Solvents	  v	  Commission	  [1974]	  ECR	  223	  [Hereinafter	  Commercial	  
Solvents].	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imply an exception to the general rule. The Court continued to reason that where the 
supply regards a raw material that was essential for competitors to operate on the 
market, refusal would eliminate all competition. In such circumstances, there might 
be an obligation on the dominant undertaking to deal. On the facts of Commercial 
Solvent, the court found that Commercial Solvents had an obligation to deal and that 
their cessation was not in compliance with article 102 TFEU.  
 
In Europe, an intellectual property owner has no general obligation to license their 
rights indiscriminately. Even if the proprietor happens to be in a dominant position of 
the relevant market, their refusal to license will not in itself be deemed as an abuse of 
a dominant position in a manner contrary to article 102 TFEU. This was first 
recognized in Volvo v. Veng. 23  This case concerned Volvo, an eminent car 
manufacturer, and a third party automobile repair service named Veng. The latter had 
sought a license for Volvo’s UK registered design for the front wing panels of the 
company’s Series 200 cars to be used in the downstream market of repair services, 
and had made an offer of reasonable royalty to that effect. Volvo expressed its refusal 
to license. In order to circumvent this, Veng began to import imitations of the design 
protected replacement parts from other member states. When the case reached the 
ECJ, the court refused to find a general obligation on Volvo as IPR owners to deal 
with its property. It then recognized that to force such an obligation on intellectual 
property right owners, even in situations where the owner would be reasonably 
compensated, ‘would lead to the proprietor thereof being deprived of the substance of 
his exclusive rights’.24 This sentiment closely echoes that of the American courts. 
However, while the court refused to find an obligation in the circumstances involved, 
the Court of Justice expressed the possibility that such an obligation could arise for an 
IPR owner in certain factual situations.25 Volvo represented the first development 
towards the eventual legal phenomenon of compulsory licensing for IPR.  
                                                
23	  Case	  238/87,	  Volvo	  v.	  Erik	  Veng	  (UK)	  Ltd,	  [1988]	  ECR	  6211,	  [1989]	  4	  CMLR	  122.	  	  [Hereinafter	  Volvo].	  
24	  ibid,	  paragraph	  135.	  
25	  The	  hypothetical	  situations	  included:	  1)	  where	  the	  dominant	  actor	  arbitrarily	  refused	  to	  supply	  
replacement	  parts	  to	  an	  independent	  repairer;	  2)	  where	  prices	  were	  fixed	  at	  an	  unreasonable	  level;	  3)	  
if	  they	  decided	  to	  abruptly	  cease	  producing	  spare	  parts	  for	  a	  model	  that	  was	  still	  in	  circulation.	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3.	  THE	  EUROPEAN	  STANCE	  
3.1.	  The	  Essential	  Facilities	  Doctrine,	  The	  EU	  Position	  
In Europe, case law regarding the essential facilities doctrine is of utmost importance, 
as its underlying rationale influenced the development of compulsory licensing for 
dominant undertakings.26 Simply put, the essential facilities doctrine is a competition 
law principle that recognizes that where a dominant undertaking holds an asset that is 
essential for competitors to compete in a downstream market, a refusal by the 
dominant undertaking to supply such goods might be considered abusive and contrary 
to competition law. In such a case, courts might be willing to mandate that a dominant 
undertaking has to provide its competitors with access to their asset. 27  The 
rationalization for such a duty is that where a dominant undertaking gains exclusive 
control over a market, and becomes the only source of input for an essential facility 
that is necessary to compete in the second market, they are not offering a better or 
cheaper alternative in the downstream market. The only effect of their exclusivity in 
the downstream market is that they gain the ‘power to harm consumers in that market 
by shutting out competitors’.28  
 
The first European application of the essential facilities doctrine can be traced to the 
Sea Containers29 case. The facility in question regarded a seaport in the United 
Kingdom that was solely controlled by Sea Containers. Stena Sealink was a ferry 
services that sought access to the seaport of Holyhead, Wales. The market in which 
Stena Sealink operated had no other viable port alternatives.30 The Commission 
defined essential facilities to mean ‘a facility or infrastructure, without access to 
                                                
26	  Jarrod	  Tudor	  ‘Compulsory	  Licensing	  in	  the	  European	  Union’	  [2012]	  4(2)	  Geo.	  Mason	  J.	  Int’l	  Com.	  
Law	  240.	  	  
27	  Mats	  A.	  Bergman.	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  Essential	  facilities	  doctrine,	  46	  Antitrust	  Bulletin,	  403,	  (2001).	  	  
28	  John	  Temple	  Lang,	  'Anticompetitive	  Abuses	  under	  Article	  82	  Involving	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights'	  
in	  Claus-­‐Dieter	  Ehlerman	  and	  Isabela	  Atanasiu	  (eds.),	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Annual	  2003:	  What	  
is	  an	  Abuse	  of	  a	  Dominant	  Position	  (Hart	  publishing,	  Oxford/Portland	  Oregon	  2003),	  18.	  	  
29	  Sea	  Containers	  v.	  Stena	  Sealink,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  December	  1993,	  IV/34.689,	  94/19/EC,	  
OJ	  1994	  L	  15/8.	  
30	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  case	  was	  settled	  by	  agreement	  amongst	  the	  two	  parties.	  There	  was	  no	  
final	  judgment	  made	  by	  the	  EC.	  But	  from	  the	  comments	  made	  by	  the	  EC,	  they	  seemed	  to	  have	  
indicated	  a	  strong	  willingness	  to	  grant	  a	  mandatory	  license	  for	  access	  of	  the	  port	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  if	  Sea	  
Containers	  not	  relinquished.	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which competitors cannot provide services to their customers’.31 In Europe, the 
doctrine had in its early phases primarily been used when the refusal to deal 
concerned access to raw materials, such as in Commercial Solvents,32 or access to 
facilities that are of an infrastructural nature.33 This can be seen in Sea Containers 
since the natural conditions of the sea meant that Sea Containers held a monopoly as 
result of the geographical conditions.  
 
Early EU case law clearly indicated that the European courts were willing to apply the 
essential facilities doctrine primarily to tangible assets. However, even at this early 
phase, the judiciary strongly indicated that intellectual property assets are not exempt 
from the application of the essential facilities doctrine. Evidence of this can be found 
in the case of European Airways v Sabena.34 The intangible asset in this case regarded 
a computer reservation system known as ‘Saphir’. The system enabled travel agents to 
book tickets without the need to contact each air travel company individually. The 
Commission was convinced by the arguments presented by European Airways that 
the reservation system was essential in order for competitors to stay in the market, and 
that it was not reasonably practical for the petitioner to duplicate the system. In 
denying European Airways access to Saphir, Sabena was found to have breached 
article 102. The reservation system was therefore classified as an essential facility, 
despite involving intangible property. 
3.2.	  The	  Three	  Cases	  on	  Refusal	  to	  License	  IPR	  
In the arena of the European Union there have so far been three major cases that 
specifically relate to the unilateral refusal to license IPR: Magill,35 IMS Health36 and, 
most recently Microsoft.37  
                                                
31	  Sea	  Containers	  v.	  Stena	  Sealink,	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  21	  December	  1993,	  IV/34.689,	  94/19/EC,	  
OJ	  1994	  L	  15/8.	  
32	  Joined	  Cases	  6	  &	  7/73	  Commercial	  Solvents	  v	  Commission	  [1974]	  ECR	  223.	  
33	  Marina	  Lao	  ‘Networks,	  Access	  and	  “Essential	  Facilities”:	  From	  Terminal	  Railroad	  to	  Microsoft’	  
[2009]	  62	  S.M.U.L.	  Rev	  557,	  571.	  
34	  European	  Airways	  v	  Sabena	  [1998]	  OJ	  L317/47,	  [1989]	  4	  CMLR	  662.	  
35	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐241/91P	  and	  C-­‐242/91P,Radio	  Telefis	  Eirean	  (RTE)	  and	  Independent	  Television	  
Publication	  Ltd	  (ITP)	  v	  Commission	  [1995]	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐743.	  [hereinafter	  Magill].	  
36	  Case	  C-­‐418/01,	  IMS	  Health	  GmbH	  &	  Co	  OHG	  v	  NDC	  Health	  GmbH	  &	  Co	  KG	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐5039	  
[Hereinafter	  IMS	  Health].	  
37	  Case	  T-­‐201/04,	  Microsoft	  v.	  Commission,	  2007	  E.C.R.	  II-­‐1	  (2007)	  [Hereinafter	  Microsoft	  (GC)].	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3.2.1.	  Magill	  and	  the	  exceptional	  circumstances	  test	  
The facts of Magill were fairly simple. In Ireland, Magill TV Guide Ltd, endeavoured 
to publish a weekly television guide that contained the television program listing of 
every channel. This would have been the first of its kind, as no comparable product 
existed on the market at the time. The reason for this was that in Ireland at the time, 
television stations were granted copyright with respect to television program listings. 
It is noteworthy to state that this was an anomaly, and amongst all member states 
within the Union, Ireland was the only country that granted copyright in such works. 
Each TV station would publish its own weekly guides for free. The defendant, RTE 
(Radio Telefis Eiremann), operated three Irish television stations, and held copyrights 
over their TV schedules which they refused to license to Magill. In defiance of RTE’s 
refusal, Magill went ahead and published their weekly television guide without 
permission, and was subsequently facing an infringement suit from RTE. As a 
defence, Magill petitioned to the European Court alleging that RTE’s refusal to 
license amounted to abuse of its dominant position contrary to article 102 TFEU.  The 
ECJ were willing to find that RTE’s behaviour amounted to abusive conduct due to 
the existence of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in the case. There were three factors in 
particular that indicated that such circumstances had materialized. Firstly, the 
information contained in the TV schedules was indispensable for the production of 
comprehensive TV program guides that Magill sought to market.  Secondly, the TV 
companies were monopolizing the downstream market of TV program magazines, 
and their refusal was effectively eliminating competition on said market. Lastly, the 
court found that RTE could not objectively justify their refusal since they voluntarily 
published TV Listing for free to chosen outlets. It was therefore clear that their reason 
for refusing Magill was to eliminate competition on the secondary market, rather than 
based on considerations relating to financial concerns. The most important sentiment 
to take away from Magill is that ‘exceptional circumstances’ has to be found in order 
to compel a dominant undertaking to grant license of their IPR under article 102 
TFEU.   
3.2.2.	  IMS	  Health	  
The second case that further developed the conditions in which European authority 
would be willing to mandate compulsory licensing was IMS Health. In this case, IMS 
Health was a company that specialized in the supply of information to the 
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pharmaceutical industry. In particular, IMS Health marketed regional sales data on 
pharmaceutical products. The company held copyright in a database that was 
nicknamed the ‘Brick Structure’. The system was built around the concept of 
segmenting the market into 1860 geographical zones. The structure was important as 
it allowed the end user to harvest information on the supply date of pharmaceutical 
products without compromising German laws on protection of personal data since 
individual pharmacies remained unidentifiable.  
 
The Brick Structure was created through close cooperation between IMS Health and 
the German pharmaceutical companies to accommodate the latter’s needs. As a result, 
the Brick Structure became the de facto industry standard and IMS Health was 
considered to hold a monopoly in the relevant market. In fact, there were only two 
competitors in the market, one of which was the American company NDC Health. 
NDC Health had at the time unsuccessfully launched alternative systems to the 1860 
Brick Structure, and found itself at a severe disadvantage since they failed to compete 
with IMS Health in the market. This was because pharmaceutical companies were 
reluctant to switch from the old system that they had become accustomed to. In other 
words, network effects arose for pharmaceutical companies, due to the necessity to 
compare data with those of competitors who were also using the same 1860 Brick 
Structure. This further entrenched IMS Health’s Brick Structure as an industry 
standard in the market. In order to circumvent this, NDC tried a different tactic to 
boost sales and decided to introduce a new product based on the 1860 Brick Structure. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, IMS Health refused NDC’s request for a license to use the 
Brick Structure.   
 
After Magill, there was some uncertainty as to the threshold of the extraordinary 
circumstances in its legal test. Were each circumstance individually sufficient, or was 
it a cumulative requirement?38 The ECJ clarified the position that the new product 
requirement is a cumulative requirement.39 Developing the case law from where 
Magill left off, the court found that refusal to license IPR could amount to abuse if:  
 
                                                
38	  Kwok,	  263,	  supra	  note	  1.	  
39	  IMS	  Health,	  paragraph	  38.	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1) The refusal to license their copyright prevented the emergence of a new 
product for which there is a potential consumer demand 
2) The refusal could not be objectively justified 
3) Refusal would exclude all competition on a secondary market and;40 
4) The IPR in question is indispensable for carrying out the activity in question 
3.2.3.	  Microsoft	  
The last in the line of cases is Microsoft. The case involved Sun Microsystems Inc., a 
software company specializing in the development of server operation systems41. The 
company lodged a complaint with the Commission against Microsoft. Specifically, 
Sun Microsystems’ contended that Microsoft was abusing its dominant position by 
refusing to supply the necessary information that would enable Sun Microsystems’ 
group server software to be interoperable with Microsoft’s PC operating system. 
Because the Microsoft Operating System was the industry standard for the majority of 
desktop computers, consumers needed servers for their computers and would opt for 
Microsoft’s servers even if they preferred Sun Microsystems’ servers (or any third 
party server) due to the lack of interoperability. Sun Microsystems contended that 
Microsoft used its dominant position on the operating system market as leverage into 
the work group server market.42  
3.2.3.1	  The	  Commission’s	  proposed	  Test:	  ‘Entirety	  of	  the	  
Circumstances’	  
In Microsoft, the Commission was influenced by conditions that were not entirely 
consistent with those laid out in previous case law. Firstly, while the Commission 
mentioned the exceptional circumstances as set out in the IMS Health/Magill test, it 
did not base its decision upon it.43 Instead, the Commission devised a new test that 
considered all relevant circumstances that could point to abuse.44 In order to come to a 
conclusion, the Commission tried to predict whether the potential disincentive effects 
                                                
40	  Magill,	  paragraph	  54.	  
41	  A	  server	  is	  a	  computer	  that	  manages	  access	  to	  a	  centralized	  resource	  or	  service	  in	  a	  network.	  	  
42	  Microsoft,	  European	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  2004,	  Case	  COMP/C-­‐3/37.792.	  
[Hereinafter	  Microsoft	  (Commission)],	  paragraph	  1350.	  
43	  James	  Killick,	  ‘IMS	  and	  Microsoft	  Judged	  in	  the	  Cold	  Light	  of	  IMS’	  [2004]	  1	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  
23,	  10.	  
44	  Microsoft,	  European	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  2004,	  Case	  COMP/C-­‐3/37.792	  [hereinafter	  Microsoft	  
(Commission)],	  paragraph	  558.	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that the obligatory license had on innovation would outweigh the potential positive 
effects of innovation gained by competitors if the license is granted. The Commission 
primarily asked whether the refusal to license would reduce the net incentive for the 
industry at whole to innovate.45 This test would be made on a case-by-case analysis. 
Anything relevant to that determination could be taken into account. The crux of the 
‘entirety of the circumstances test’ as laid out by the Commission was an entirely new 
approach unprecedented in case law.46 The legal effect of the ‘entirety of the 
circumstances test’ meant that even where the conditions laid out in Magill/IMS 
Health’s exceptional circumstances test was not met, an abuse could still potentially 
be found. 
 
However, when Microsoft sought to annul the Commission’s decision, the GC did not 
endorse the ‘entirety of the circumstances test’. While the GC upheld the 
Commission’s findings in the sense that it still found Microsoft had acted contrary to 
article 102, the GC did not defer to the Commission’s ‘Entirety of the Circumstances’ 
test. Instead the GC reinstated the exceptional circumstances test of Magill. The GC 
reformulated the judgment to fit within the parameters of Magill/IMS Health. It did so 
by stating that an abuse could be found in Microsoft because the elements of 
“exceptional circumstances” could be found. In particular, the GC focused on the 
factor that Microsoft’s operating system was indispensable for the market, and would 
exclude all effective competition on the secondary market of the server systems that 
Sun Microsystems operated in. Furthermore, Microsoft’s refusal could not be 
objectively justified, and their refusal to license their IPR prevented Sun 
Microsystems’ from launching their server software. Therefore, the circumstances 
fulfilled the test espoused in Magill/IMS Health. On the test created by the 
Commission, the GC stated that it is only in factual scenarios where one of the criteria 
in the Magill/IMS Health test was absent that wider circumstances could be 
considered in the determination of whether a mandatory license was appropriate.47 
                                                
45	  Francois	  Lévêque,	  ‘Innovation,	  Leveraging	  and	  Essential	  facilities:	  Interoperability	  Licensing	  in	  the	  
EU	  Microsoft	  Case’	  [2005]	  28(1)	  World	  Competition,	  84.	  
46	  Simonetta	  Vezzoso,	  ‘The	  Incentive	  Balance	  Test	  in	  the	  EU	  Microsoft	  Case:	  A	  Pro-­‐innovation	  
“Economics-­‐Based”	  Approach?’	  [2006]	  27(7)	  E.C.L.R	  382,	  387.	  
47	  Microsoft	  (GC)	  paragraph	  316-­‐317.	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Therefore, while the ‘entirety of circumstances’ used by the Commission has not been 
abolished outright, its role has been severely circumscribed to that of a tie-breaker.48  
3.3.	  Interpreting	  the	  Case	  Law	  
The four-pronged test as espoused by the court in Magill and IMS still stands as the 
current standard for determining what circumstances need to be present in order for a 
court to be willing to mandate a dominant undertaking to license its IPR. The 
following discussion will now look into the finer aspects of each branch of the test. 
Particularly, it will examine the rationale of the requirement and the standard set for 
each element.  
3.3.1.	  The	  new	  product	  Rule	  
The new product requirement is an invention of the ECJ that has no precedent in 
national legislation of the member states. The most likely explanation for its creation 
was that in the actual circumstances it was a factor that helped distinguish Magill 
from the earlier Volvo case that was rejected by the courts. One of the beneficial 
aspects of the rule is that it helps to ensure that compulsory licenses will only be 
ordered where it has a net beneficial effect on the market. In Bronner,49 AG Jacob 
was concerned with the detrimental effect that ordering a compulsory licensing would 
have in the long term versus the positive effect it would have on competition in the 
short term.50 He reasoned that frequent use of such orders could potentially decrease 
the incentives of IPR owners to innovate.51 To offset such potentially harmful effects 
on the competition market, he stated that one thing that would tip the balance in 
favour of such an order would be that the dominant undertaking’s behaviour on the 
secondary market prevented the emergence of a ‘much needed new product’ by the 
consumer.52 The new product requirement therefore introduces the consideration of 
fulfilling consumers’ needs into the Magill/IMS Health test. By doing so, consumer 
welfare becomes a necessary component of the test that has to be considered in order 
                                                
48	  Microsoft	  (GC)	  paragraph	  704-­‐710,	  Claudia	  Schmidt	  and	  Wolfgang	  Kerber,	  ‘Microsoft,	  Refusal	  to	  
License	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  and	  the	  Incentive	  Balance	  Test	  of	  the	  EU	  Commission’	  [2008]	  11,	  
Available	  at	  SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1297939	  accessed	  26th	  May	  2015.	  
49	  C-­‐7/97,Oscar	  Bronner	  v	  Mediaprint	  [1998]	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐7791	  [Hereinafter	  Bronner].	  
50	  AG	  Jacobs	  in	  Bronner,	  paragraph	  57.	  
51	  ibid,	  paragraph	  57.	  
52	  ibid,	  paragraph	  63.	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to justify competition interference.53 Consequently, AG Jacob’s comments seem to 
suggest that refusal to license will only be viewed as abusive if the behaviour has 
fulfilled the four-pronged-test of Magill, and that there is a clear and unsatisfied 
consumer demand for the new product in question.54 In other words, in the scenario 
where there is an introduction of a new product that consumers have no need for, a 
compulsory license cannot be justified.  
 
The importance of the new product requirement is particularly emphasized in Tierce 
Ladbroke. 55 In that case, the applicant, a Belgian bookmaker trading under the name: 
Tierce Ladbroke, sought permission to retransmit a television broadcast of horse races 
organized by the defendant. After the defendant had denied their request, Ladbroke 
lodged a complaint with the commission alleging that such refusal was an abuse 
contrary to article 102. The GC were unwilling to find that the product in question 
was essential since it could not be said that Ladbroke was trying to launch a new 
product56 ‘whose introduction might be prevented’ as a result of the refusal.57 
Consequently, courts have shown that lack of a new product could be an explicit 
consideration for refusing a compulsory license.   
 
While it has been established that a new product is a mandatory consideration, it is 
also necessary to consider what constitutes a new product. Does the product have to 
be completely new in substance? Will improvements or even new features suffice? In 
AG Tizzano’s opinion in the case of IMS Health, he commented that a new product 
has come into being, as long as the petitioner did not ‘limit itself’ to ‘duplicating the 
goods or services already offered on the secondary market by the owners of the 
intellectual property right’. The requirement of a new product would be fulfilled when 
it was of a ‘different nature’ and answered consumer requirements that existing goods 
or services were unable to satisfy.58 AG Tizzano’s definition is quite expansive. A 
literal reading of his description meant that even minor improvements on the previous 
                                                
53	  AG	  Jacobs	  in	  Bronner,	  paragraph	  58.	  
54	  Ahlborn	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  54.	  	  	  
55	  C-­‐504/94,	  Tierce	  Ladbroke	  SA	  v.	  Commission	  [1997]	  ECR	  II-­‐923	  [Hereinafter	  Ladbroke].	  
56	  Defined	  in	  this	  case	  by	  the	  GC	  as:	  a	  product	  with	  ‘specific,	  constant	  and	  regular	  potential	  demand	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  consumers’.	  	  
57	  Ladbroke,	  paragraph	  I-­‐823	  to	  I-­‐824.	  
58	  AG	  Tizzano	  in	  IMS	  Health,	  paragraph	  65.	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product could satisfy the threshold.59 This could be the reason why the Court made no 
comment on AG Tizzano’s reference that different characteristics could be sufficient 
to meet the new product criteria. Therefore, this could be seen as a rejection of AG 
Tizzano’s test. Instead, the Court forwarded its own formulation that a product is 
considered new if it is ‘new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right 
and for which there is a potential consumer demand’. Alternatively, it has been 
suggested that the correct interpretation should be that the main impetus of the new 
product criteria is not whether consumers really do want the new characteristics. 
Instead, the test inquires whether consumers’ willingness to pay for the new aspects 
of the product outweigh the potential increase in cost for the improvements.60 This is 
empirically easier to establish.  
 
Concerns have been raised as to whether the new product requirement has been 
relaxed as a result of Microsoft. In Microsoft, the Commission was never able to 
identify a new product in the same manner as Magill and arguably IMS Health. The 
petitioner, Sun Microsystems, was not petitioning a license for a new product. They 
petitioned for an already existing product, which required certain information in order 
to develop interoperability with Microsoft’s newer Operating Systems. In regard to 
the new product requirement, the Commission merely stated that Microsoft’s refusal 
to supply information of interoperability could prevent competitors from developing 
hypothetical new products.  
 
When the case reached the GC, the GC included the term ‘technical development’ as 
within the meaning of a new product.61 In this respect the GC stated that the 
competitor’s goods must ‘differentiate their products from Microsoft with respect to 
certain parameters and certain features’.62 This formulation by the GC is reminiscent 
of AG Tizzano’s reference to different characteristics that was already rejected by the 
ECJ. Based on this reading, it is suggested that the proper manner in which the new 
product requirement should be construed is that it encompasses improved technical 
features of a previous product.   
                                                
59	  Ahlborn	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  54,	  1121.	  
60	  Lévêque,	  supra	  note	  45,	  85.	  
61	  Microsoft	  (GC),	  paragraph	  563.	  	  
62	  Microsoft	  (GC)	  paragraph	  563.Paragraph	  653.	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3.3.2.	  Objective	  Justification	  
Little guidance has been offered in the past regarding what amounts to objective 
justification in the Magill/IMS Health test.63 Courts have merely stated that where the 
dominant undertaking is incapable of providing objective justification for their 
refusal, this, combined with the other factors of the test would amount to abuse. The 
European Courts have primarily defined the test in negative terms, by stating what 
cannot amount to objective justification rather than what could positively fulfil the 
criteria set by the test. This can be seen in Microsoft, where the Commission found 
that the right to exclude in intellectual property law could not in itself be considered 
an objective justification for refusal to deal when extraordinary circumstances are 
present.64 Furthermore in Microsoft, the company attempted to use the objective 
justification as a defence by arguing that a compulsory license order would cause 
severe disincentive to innovate. However, the GC dismissed the argument on the basis 
that it was too theoretical in nature.65 Microsoft has therefore raised the threshold of 
objective justification that dominant undertakings need to cross in order to escape 
liability.  
3.3.3.	  Exclusion	  of	  Competition	  in	  secondary	  markets	  
The requirement that there has to be exclusion of competition in a secondary market 
makes sense if we consider the following scenarios: 
 
Firstly, where only one market exists, and the dominant undertaking was using its IPR 
to exclude competition, no compulsory license could be ordered as no abuse has taken 
place.66 The IPR owner has only exercised their IPR within the legal scope granted to 
them by intellectual property law in a legitimate manner. Intellectual property law is 
supposed to reward owners for their innovative efforts in a manner that allows them 
to exclude their competitors in the primary market. In turn, such a reward allows them 
to harvest monetary profits from their monopoly position over a limited time. 
Secondly, in scenarios where a distinct separate market exists, but the dominant 
undertaking is not present in the secondary market, there would still be no duty on the 
                                                
63	  Killick,	  supra	  note	  43,	  37.	  
64	  Microsoft	  (GC)	  paragraph	  691.	  
65	  Microsoft	  (GC)	  paragraph	  698.	  
66	  Temple,	  Supra	  note	  28,	  5.	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dominant undertaking to deal,67 as was witnessed in Ladbroke. This is because there 
are no anticompetitive intentions on the dominant undertaking’s part. Thirdly, where 
the dominant undertaking is present in the secondary market, but they are not utilizing 
their relevant IPR, there would be no obligation to deal. This is because the dominant 
undertaking’s continued ability to operate in the secondary market without it clearly 
proves that the IPR is not essential to operate in the secondary market. 68 
Consequently, it is only when there is both a secondary market and the dominant 
undertaking has exercised their IPR in a manner that would exclude competition in 
this downstream market that abuse is said to have taken place.69 Where a dominant 
undertaking extends their IPR to monopolize a secondary market, the dominant 
undertaking would effectively extend their exclusive rights beyond the ambit that was 
intended by the original grant of IPR protection. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the 
standard set for this branch of the test is not a rigid one. In Microsoft, the GC found 
that exclusion of competition in the secondary market is sufficiently met as long as 
there is ‘the possibility of identifying a separate market’ even if it had not 
materialized yet.70 In other words, this reiterated the comments made in IMS Health, 
that a ‘potential or even hypothetical market’ would meet the conditions of a 
secondary market.71  
 
Another issue for consideration is the proportion of competition that needs to be 
eliminated in order to fulfil the test. Does the test require all competition to be 
eliminated? Early case law seemed to suggest such an intention. In Magill, the 
standard of complete foreclosure required for a finding of abuse was that the refusal 
to supply would have to exclude all competition in a secondary market.72 This was 
reiterated in Bronner where it was stated that the refusal must be ‘such as to exclude 
any competition on a secondary market’.73  
 
                                                
67	  ibid,	  22.	  
68	  Ibid,	  5.	  
69	  Josef	  Drexl,	  ‘Abuse	  of	  Dominance	  in	  Licensing	  and	  Refusal	  to	  License:	  A	  ‘More	  Economic	  Approach’	  
to	  Competition	  by	  Imititation	  and	  Competition	  by	  Substitution’	  in	  Claus-­‐Dieter	  Ehlerman	  and	  Isabela	  
Atanasiu	  (eds.),	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Annual	  2005:	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  is	  an	  Abuse	  of	  a	  Dominant	  Position	  
(Hart	  publishing,	  Oxford/Portland	  Oregon	  2005),	  18-­‐19.	  
70	  Microsoft	  (GC),	  Paragraph	  335.	  
71	  IMS	  Health,	  paragraph	  44.	  
72	  Magill,	  paragraph	  56.	  	  
73	  IMS	  Health,	  paragraph	  38.	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However since Microsoft, it should be noted that for the finding of abuse it is not 
necessary to show that all competition has already been eliminated. It was posited that 
such a requirement would be unfair as by the time such an effect has materialized it 
would be too late to be of any benefit to the competitor. By that time, they would have 
already been excluded from the market entirely. The GC therefore found that the 
threshold would be met where ‘the refusal at issue is liable to, or is likely to, eliminate 
all effective competition on the market.’74 Such a stance is particularly commendable 
since it takes into account that elimination of competition where network effects were 
concerned is often irreversible. 75 
3.3.4.	  Indispensability	  
The indispensability requirement might serve the most significant role for the 
“exceptional circumstances” test of Magill. The term indispensability is closely 
related to the essential facilities doctrine and several academic authors have used the 
two terms interchangeably.76 One academic referred to the criteria of the Magill/IMS 
Health test as a modified essential facilities test.77  
 
How is the indispensability requirement met? One important aspect to meet the 
threshold of indispensability is that the petitioner must be able to prove that the 
facility in question is not an esoteric need for the individual in question, but is 
essential for all competitors in the market in order to stay viable. This is best 
exemplified in the case of Bronner,78 where the claimant of the same name brought a 
complaint against Mediaprint. Mediaprint was a publishing company that owned two 
Austrian newspapers. At the time, they had established a nationwide distribution 
network that Bronner wanted to join but was excluded from. As a result Bronner 
alleged that Mediaprint as a dominant company had violated article 102 TFEU by 
refusing Bronner access to their distribution network.  
                                                
74	  Microsoft	  (GC)	  (emphasis	  added	  by	  author),	  at	  563.	  
75	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  622,	  175.	  
76	  See	  authors	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  Bronner	  GmbH	  &	  Co.	  KG	  v	  Mediaprint	  [1998]	  I-­‐07791.	  
 28 
 
Strictly speaking, the facts Bronner did not encompass IPR, but it is of relevance to 
the discussion as AG Jacobs explicitly extended his opinion to be applicable to IPR as 
well. 79  AG Jacobs stated that ‘a particular competitor cannot plead that it is 
particularly vulnerable’.80 In other words, the refusal to deal will only amount to 
abuse if it places all competitors in the market at disadvantage and not only the 
petitioning applicant.81 The threshold for indispensability therefore requires that the 
refusal must be structural in nature. ‘[I]f the cost of duplicating the facility alone is a 
barrier to entry, it must be such as to deter any prudent undertaking from entering the 
market’. In other words, AG Jacobs noted that the test for indispensability must be 
objective.   
 
Another aspect of indispensability is that the facility in question cannot be readily 
duplicated by the competitor’s own efforts. In Bronner, the facility was merely a 
distribution network composed of contacts of various media outlets and distribution 
companies. There were no technical, legal or economic barriers that would make it 
‘impossible or even reasonably difficult’ for either Bronner or any other publisher to 
implement a comparable nationwide home-delivery system as Mediaprint had done.82 
More specifically, for an intangible property to be considered indispensable under this 
test, the duplication of the facility must be impossible ‘owing to physical, 
geographical or legal constraints’.83 The legal constraint mentioned by AG Jacobs in 
this quote seems to refer to the illegality of duplicating assets that are protected by 
intellectual property law. Thus, it is posited that in the right circumstances, IPR might 
lend itself to an easier finding of indispensability, as its duplication will almost 
always be legally barred. On the other hand, a tangible property would not have this 
inevitable conclusion for its duplication.  
 
 
 
                                                
79	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  M.	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To summarize, in order to find if the license which the petitioner is seeking access to 
is indispensable it must be established that:  
 
1. It must be useful for the exercise of the activity in question.84  
2. Circumstances must be considered: whether there are any alternative options for the 
petition ‘even if they are less advantageous’ that could achieve a similar effect.85 
3. Finally, it has to be established that the effort of duplicating the facility ‘is not 
economically viable’ and constitutes a barrier to enter the market to such an extent 
that it would deter ‘any prudent undertaking from entering’.86  
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4.	  THE	  AMERICAN	  STANCE	  
4.1.	  Compulsory	  Licenses	  Post	  eBay	  
The Supreme Court case of eBay v. MercExchange87 represents an interesting 
potential shift in the default position for compulsory licensing of IPR in America. 
In this case, MercExchange, an online-auction company, were in negotiations to 
license its business methods to eBay and Half.com. After the negotiations fell 
through, MercExchange decided to sue both companies for patent infringement 
and sought an order from the court for permanent injunctive relief to prevent them 
from continued usage of the patented method. The result of the litigation was that 
MercExchange’s patent was found to be valid and had been infringed by the 
defendants. The Supreme Court however, made the ground-breaking decision that 
even where patent infringement is found, it does not immediately follow that 
permanent injunction should be ordered as a general rule.88 Instead, an additional 
burden is put on the plaintiff to prove that unusual circumstances are present that 
would warrant an injunction.89  
 
The implications of the ruling in eBay means that where the plaintiff fails to fulfil 
the test laid out in the case, the infringer will be allowed continued usage of the 
IPR. The absence of an injunctive order effectively creates a form of compulsory 
license, in that the infringers will be allowed continued usage of the patent in 
contradiction of the patent owner’s wishes. The legacy of the eBay decision has 
led to an increase of compulsory licenses of this kind being granted in lieu of 
permanent injunctions.90 However, it is suggested by this author that this type of 
compulsory license does not resemble compulsory licenses made under antitrust 
policies that are considered in this dissertation. Firstly, eBay never invoked the 
essential facilities doctrine in its defence. Secondly, MercExchange was not a 
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  eBay	  Inc.	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  Licenses	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dominant undertaking for the purpose of section 2 of the Sherman Act, and there 
was no allegation that any abuse against antitrust law had taken place as a result of 
MercExchange’s actions. The Supreme Court did not base their decision on any 
legal analysis that involved considerations of antitrust concerns. Consequently, it 
is suggested that this case will probably not affect compulsory licensing for the 
purposes of forcing a dominant undertaking to deal their IPRs through the 
enforcement of antitrust law.  
 
The difference between eBay and traditional compulsory license cases can be further 
substantiated in the subsequent case of Paice.91 In Paice, it was alleged that Toyota 
had infringed upon Paice’s drive-train patents by incorporating them into Toyota’s 
hybrid car models. While the Federal Circuit was willing to find that such an 
infringement had taken place, relying on eBay, the court refused to grant Paice the 
permanent injunction, which they had sought for. Instead the Federal Circuit ordered 
that Paice should receive an on-going royalty payment from Toyota for the infringing 
products.92 The most noteworthy aspect of this case was that the majority declined to 
describe the proposed remedy as a ‘compulsory license’, but preferred the term of 
‘on-going royalty’.93 The difference in definition is not merely one of linguistic 
semantics but has lasting legal repercussions. The majority opinion stated that a 
compulsory license, once ordered, opens the floodgates to any competitor wishing to 
access the IPR in question,94 provided of course, that the applicant pays a reasonable 
royalty. On the other hand, on-going royalty, as used in eBay and the line of cases that 
followed in this area, is limited only to the individual defendant in the litigation.95 
This runs contrary to the underlying rationale of the essential facilities doctrine, which 
provides that the facility in question has to be so essential that its access must be 
granted to any competitor in the secondary market for them to survive.96 If the need 
for the facility is particular to only the applicant’s need, a compulsory order will be 
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denied. Because of this, eBay is not particularly helpful to deduce the legal position of 
American Courts in granting compulsory licenses of IPR against dominant 
undertakings for antitrust purposes. Thus, this dissertation assumes that the eBay case 
will not affect the case law in this area.  
4.2.	  Essential	  Facilities,	  The	  American	  Stance	  
American Courts have shown more reluctance in embracing the essential facilities 
doctrine than their European counterparts. This is ironic considering that the doctrine 
originated in America and is something that Europe has incorporated into its 
jurisprudence.  
 
While not the first case on the essential facilities doctrine, MCI97 is often quoted in 
this area, as it is one of the first cases in America that set out a clear legal test for the 
essential facilities doctrine. In this case, AT&T held a monopoly in the local and long 
distance telephone market. MCI, a competitor in the provision of long-distance 
telephone services, offered a competitive service but required access to AT&T’s “last 
mile” of wire in order to successfully connect the call to its end users. As is customary 
of these cases, AT&T refused to allow MCI access to its wires, and the latter brought 
a complaint alleging that AT&T had breached section 2 of the Sherman Act. In their 
decision, the court found that the following conditions had to exist in order for the 
application of the essential facilities doctrine to be appropriate:  
 
1. A Monopolist must control accessibility to an essential facility. 
2. It is not reasonable for a competitor to replicate a second facility.   
3. The monopolist has refused to grant access to the facility to its competitors 
4. It is feasible for the monopolist to share its facility with its competitors. In 
other words, it would not place an unreasonable burden on the monopolist’s 
own ability to conduct business in doing so.  
 
The conditions espoused in MCI have become the standard test to be applied in cases 
relating to the essential facilities doctrine. This can be seen in Aspen,98 one of the 
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most famous American cases on unilateral refusal to deal. The case featured Ski Co. 
that owned and effectively controlled three out of four mountains at a ski resort. The 
plaintiff Highlands, owned the fourth. Although they were competitors the two had a 
history of cooperating in offering customers a popular multi-day joint ticket where 
access to all four mountains was available. The contention arose out of the fact that 
Ski Co. revoked this offer, without any credible business justification. Because the 
defendant owned three out of four mountains, tourists would not be willing to 
purchase tickets for access of the plaintiff’s sole mountain without access to the 
remaining three. Applying the MCI test, the 10th Circuit found that the plaintiff should 
be given access based on the essential facilities doctrine. Firstly, Highlands controlled 
access to the mountains, as a result of their ownership. Secondly, it is impossible for 
the defendant to replicate mountains, as it is a geographical condition. Third, access to 
the defendant’s three mountains was denied when Highlands ceased to cooperate. 
Finally, the defendant could not deny that it was feasible for them to share their 
facility as they had past history of doing so. As the collaboration had been profitable 
for both parties, the defendant could not argue that it placed a burden on their 
business to conduct business. The Supreme Court therefore found that the case 
fulfilled the test of MCI and that the defendant had abused their dominant position by 
their refusal to deal.  
4.3.	  No	  Essential	  Facilities	  Doctrine	  for	  Intellectual	  Property	  
Assets	  
Because of the way Courts are structured in the US, the various Circuit Courts’99 
jurisdictions are based on geographical division, and while the Courts should 
endeavour to rule consistently with precedent decisions made by previous Circuit 
Courts,100 they are not bound to do so. This has led to fragmented case law in the area 
of compulsory licensing for dominant undertakings.  
 
There are certain cases which indicated that the essential facilities doctrine could be 
applicable for IPR to mandate compulsory licensing. This could be seen in Feist 
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Publications.101 The case regarded intangible property in the form of copyrighted 
information where the defendant had refused to allow the plaintiff the use of its listing 
of telephone numbers in a catalogue. The court stated that while ‘the doctrine of 
essential facilities has been applied predominantly to tangible assets, there is no 
reason why it could not apply as in this case, to information wrongfully withheld’.102 
The effect in both situations is the same: a party is prevented from accessing 
something that is essential to compete in the market.103 However, the strength of this 
comment is thrown into doubt as the court went on to abolish the copyright of the 
property in question rather than mandate a licensed use for the petitioner. The 
comment was made obiter dicta and had little relevance to the ruling itself.  
 
The possibility of the essential facilities doctrine being applicable to IPR is further 
suggested by the case of Intergraph.104 In this case, the asset concerned was clearly an 
IPR. The facts revolved around the computer company Intel that had ceased its 
previous supply of patented Intel chips to Intergraph. This cessation took place while 
Intergraph was pursuing an infringement suit against certain Intel customers regarding 
an Intergraph owned patent. Consequently, it was obvious that Intel ceased their 
supply as retaliation for the infringement suit and with the intent of coercing 
Intergraph into dropping the lawsuit. The termination was not based on any economic 
considerations. The District Court held that Intel had a dominant share in the relevant 
market and found that Intel’s refusal to deal was abusive for the purposes of section 2 
of the Sherman act. Intel’s chips were considered an essential facility because the 
chips could not be procured from any other source but Intel. Additionally, they could 
not be feasibly duplicated due to the patent rights held by them. Finally, because 
access to the chips was essential for effective competition, all the requirements as 
envisaged in MCI were fulfilled. Had the case ended there, it would have been a clear 
indication that the essential facilities doctrine is applicable to IPR. However, when the 
case went to appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the case. It is 
suggested that the legal reasoning of Integraph cannot be completely disregarded in 
spite of this. The Federal Circuit did not base their reversal on the ground that it is 
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unsuitable to apply the essential facilities doctrine to IPRs.105 Instead, the case was 
reversed on the consideration that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Intel 
and the Plaintiffs could be considered competitors. Because they were not 
competitors, Intergraph could not make out the claim that Intel denied them access to 
their essential facilities in order to eliminate competition. It is posited however, that 
the reversal in this case does not weaken the proposition that the essential facility test 
of MCI is inapplicable to intellectual property. If anything, it clearly shows that the 
Federal Circuit decision applied the MCI test, but based on the facts of the case, found 
that it did not fulfil the conditions of the test. This indicates that the Federal Circuit 
found it appropriate to apply the MCI test based on the essential facilities doctrine 
with regards to IPR. It is therefore arguable that the judgment in relation to the 
Court’s view on Essential Facilities’ applicability to IPR still stands.  
 
The same argument can be applied to Aldridge. In Aldridge,106 Microsoft prevented 
Aldridge’s disk caching program from operating on their operating system Windows 
95, while simultaneously launching their own competing disk caching program in the 
operating system. As a result, Aldridge filed a suit against Microsoft, alleging that 
Window’s operating system was an essential facility because it was the preferred 
choice of a vast majority of desktop computer users. Aldridge further contended that 
without access to the operating system, they could not compete on the disk caching 
market. The Court applied the MCI test and found that, on the facts presented before 
them, Windows 95 could not be considered essential. The Court’s reasoning was that 
essential facilities doctrine only occurs when the facility in question is either a natural 
monopoly or monopoly gained as a result of government support.107 The problem 
with both Intergraph and Aldridge is that the plaintiffs were seeking for continued 
access that primarily benefited themselves, and not the market as a whole.108 This 
seemed to be a concern for the courts, which stated that ‘a facility is essential under 
the antitrust laws only when it is vital to both the plaintiff’s individual competitive 
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viability and the viability of the market in general’.109 Regardless of the result of the 
judgment there seemed to be no doubt in the court’s mind that the essential facilities 
doctrine applied to IPR.   
 
However, the aforementioned judgments might be seen as grasping at straws in light 
of the most recent development in the Trinko decision.110 Trinko, is the latest Supreme 
Court case on refusal to deal, and has become the leading case on whether or not such 
conduct amounts to a violation contrary to section 2 of the Sherman Act.111 In this 
case, not only did the Supreme Court cast serious doubt over the applicability of the 
essential facilities doctrine to IPR, but their comments also seemed to strongly hint 
that the doctrine is inappropriate as a sanction for refusal to deal regarding all assets.  
 
The case of Trinko concerned Verizon, a global telecommunication service provider 
that held absolute monopoly over such service lines. As a consequence, all other 
competing telecommunication companies had to pay remuneration to Verizon for 
usage in order to operate in the telecommunications industry. Curtis Trinko was a 
disgruntled customer of AT&T, a company that competed with Verizon. He led a 
class action suit against Verizon, contending that the company was discriminating 
against competitors, by providing its own customers with better service than that of its 
rivals. Specifically, Verizon delayed processing orders when supplying 
telecommunications services for competing telephone companies such as AT&T, who 
were newer on the market. It was alleged that such discrimination was contrary to the 
anti-monopoly 1996 Telecommunication Act as well as an abuse of their dominant 
position in the market according to the Sherman Act Section 2.  
 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that under US antitrust law there are two general 
exceptions to the rule where a dominant undertaking has full discretion to refuse to 
deal. The first exception relates to where the defendant terminates supply for a 
previous existing business relation, and the second known exception is the essential 
facilities doctrine. It was contended by the plaintiff’s legal advocates that the latter 
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exception applies since the required elements set out in MCI were fulfilled. Firstly, 
Verizon owned all the service lines. Secondly it was unfeasible for competitors to use 
an alternate source. Finally, the telecommunications carried elements of public good, 
which is a trait of previous essential facilities. However, such legal reasoning made 
little impression on the Supreme Court. Not only did the Supreme Court find that the 
doctrine was not applicable on the facts. Justice Scalia famously stated that the 
essential facilities doctrine was an invention of the lower courts and that the Supreme 
Court has ‘never recognized such a doctrine’.112 The Supreme Court’s denial of a 
formal recognition of the essential facilities doctrine seems surprising in light of the 
Supreme Court case of Aspen, which seemed to fully embrace the essential facilities 
doctrine. However, there has always been ambiguity as to what Aspen as a case 
represents. Is it a case that was decided on the essential facilities doctrine or on 
grounds of refusal of continued supply?113 Read as a standalone, the judgment seems 
to have been heavily influenced by both principles. In Trinko however, the Supreme 
Court did not acknowledge that Aspen as a case was decided on the merits of the 
essential facilities doctrine. Instead, Justice Scalia interpreted the determination of 
abuse to be founded on the fact that the dominant undertaking had without objective 
reason terminated a financially beneficial relationship with a voluntary previous 
customer.  
 
While the Supreme Court refused to confirm the essential facilities doctrine, it also 
refused to reject the doctrine.114 Instead, the only legal analysis the Supreme Court 
provided on the essential facilities doctrine was to express that even if the doctrine 
should hypothetically exist, it still would not apply in the circumstances of the case.115 
This was because the indispensable requirement of the doctrine only applies where 
the facility in question is unavailable. On the facts of the case, competitors were 
allowed access to the service lines, albeit subject to disadvantageous conditions. 
Construed this way, the Supreme Court’s comments seem to suggest that 
discriminatory or disadvantageous access will never amount to abuse contrary to 
section 2 of the Sherman act. A narrow reading of the judgment does not restrict 
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future courts from applying the essential facilities doctrine to unilateral refusals to 
deal.  
 
The intended effect of Trinko was to significantly decrease the already rare use of the 
essential facilities doctrine in the United States.116 Still, the relevance of the essential 
facilities doctrine might not be completely extinct post Trinko. Mentions of the 
doctrine have been made since, such as in NYMEX.117 In this case, the District Court 
denied the petitioner access to essential facilities, because the facility in question was 
not essential. Therefore, even though no grant was given, the lower court seemed to 
imply that the doctrine was still valid, and that the test had not been fulfilled, as 
opposed to denying the viability of the doctrine as a whole.118  
4.4.	  Near	  Immunity	  for	  refusing	  to	  deal	  Intellectual	  Property	  
So far the discussion has shown that the American courts’ response to the essential 
facilities doctrine, as a legal argument for compulsory licenses, has been lukewarm at 
best. It is posited however, that the real issue lies with the American courts’ strong 
tendency to give intellectual property law priority over antitrust law. This has led to a 
state of law where there is a near immunity for IPR owners who refuse to deal, 
regardless of whatever relevancy antitrust law may have.   
4.4.1.	  Kodak	  versus	  Xerox	  
In Kodak, the company of the same name was a manufacturer of photocopiers as well 
as the dominant supplier of replacement parts. 119  Kodak also competed with 
independent service organisations (ISOs) on the secondary market for repairs and 
service of their photocopiers. A dispute arose when Kodak stopped selling their 
patented replacement parts to ISOs. This policy restricted ISOs’ access to the 
replacement parts they needed in the service market. In the long term the effect of this 
strategy would have enabled Kodak to drive out the competition and monopolize the 
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repair and services market. The Ninth Circuit found that the refusal to deal was 
abusive.  
 
For the Ninth Circuit, a particular persuasive factor was convincing evidence that 
Kodak primarily used the IPR claim as a pretext.120 Former employees testified to this 
effect.121 This led the court to the conclusion that rather than genuine intention to 
protect its IPR, Kodak desired to shut out ISOs from the repair and service market. 
The Ninth Circuit found that while the grant of patent lawfully allowed Kodak to 
exclude competitors from the primary market of selling photocopiers through its IPR, 
it did not have the right to do so on the secondary market of service and repairs for 
such copiers. The court stated that the ‘basic right of exclusion’ granted by patent law 
‘does have limits’ and will not ‘protect an attempt to extend a lawful monopoly 
beyond the grant of a patent’.122  
 
The court in Kodak focused on intent. Specifically, the court was concerned with 
intent that is pretence. This refers to situations where the real agenda of IPR owner’s 
exclusion is not to protect their IPR but merely to use it as an excuse to be able to 
eliminate competitors without incurring liability under the Sherman Act. Where this 
occurs, courts would be willing to infer that abuse had taken place as a result of the 
dominant undertaking’s actions, regardless of the rights of exclusivity conferred from 
IPR.123  
 
Shortly afterwards, a case in which the facts were almost identical to Kodak, a 
surprisingly contrasting judgment was reached. In the case of Xerox,124 a company of 
the same name was primarily in the business of manufacturing photocopiers. Xerox 
also provided replacement parts and repair services to its customers, much like the 
Kodak case. A dispute arose when Xerox refused to continue selling its patented 
replacement parts to ISOs that also provided repair services for end users of Xerox 
photocopiers. The Federal Circuit took no heed of the Kodak judgment set out by the 
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Ninth Circuit, and refused to find any wrongdoing done by Xerox that could amount 
to violation of Section 2 of the Sherman act. Instead, the Federal Circuit stressed the 
absolute right vested in IPR owners to exclude any and all parties from their 
invention. The only exceptions that existed to this absolute right were “illegal tying, 
fraud in patent and trademark office, or sham litigation”.125 The Federal Circuit found 
that so long as Xerox, or any IPR owner did not act outside of the scope of protection 
conferred by the grant of the patent, their refusal could not amount to a violation. In 
effect, this grants IPR owners a near immunity from antitrust enforcement with 
respect to their refusal to deal.126  
 
The stance taken in Xerox is strongly reminiscent of the Data General case. 127 Data 
General sued Grumman, a third party company that repaired and serviced computers, 
for infringement. As a defence, Grumman counterclaimed by filing a claim that Data 
General was committing antitrust violations as a dominant undertaking by refusing to 
license ADEX, a diagnostic computer software program. As a response, the First 
Circuit ruled that an ‘author’s desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted 
work is a presumptively valid business justification’.128 The dominant undertaking 
would not be considered to be acting contrary to section 2 of the Sherman act 
provided that it could provide evidence that there was a valid business justification for 
their refusal to deal. This test in the context of IPR will almost always be satisfied. 
Compare this to the First Circuit findings in Data General that ‘an author’s desire to 
exclude others from use of its copyright work is presumptively valid business 
justification for any immediate harm to consumers’.129 In other words, the wish to 
exclude competition is itself a presumptively objective reasoning to refuse to deal. 
Since this element will almost always be present in refusal to deal cases, there is a per 
se legality for IPR owners to exclude competitors under competition law.130  
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4.5.	  The	  Limited	  Exception	  in	  US	  for	  Standard	  Essential	  Patents	  
It is of interest to remark on the recent development in the related area of SEP, which 
have deviated from the restrictive stance on compulsory license for IPR. SEP are 
patents deemed so essential that they must be used in order to comply with a technical 
standard in the industry. Such standards are decided by the relevant Standard Setting 
Organizations (SSO), of which thousands of standards exists for each particular 
industry. Undertakings that join SSO do so on pre-established terms. The most 
important one being that if their patents are declared to be SEP, the undertaking will 
commit themselves to allow third party members within the SSO to license their SEP. 
The terms of the license will of course be subject to negotiation, usually determined 
by terms set out in FRAND.131  
 
Strictly speaking, these cases do not follow the traditional framework of cases for 
compulsory licensing of IPR. Unlike cases like Magill, the relevant dominant 
undertaking has already entered into a commitment to license. The courts can 
therefore skip the preliminaries of trying to determine whether there is a need of 
indispensability for the industry, since the SSO has already established that. Instead 
the relevant question in these cases is whether or not the SEP owner still retains its 
right to exclude competitors that are members of the SSO and willing to license, in 
accordance with licensing revenue set by FRAND.  
 
In Motorola,132 the case revolved around SEP needed to make smart-phone devices.  
Google, Motorola’s parent company, had threatened to pursue infringement suits 
against competing companies to prevent access from SEP that they needed to produce 
competing devices. These competing companies were all members of the SSO and 
were willing to license these patents on FRAND terms.133  In response to these 
allegations, the FTC launched investigations against Google, to determine whether 
Motorola’s actions in seeking injunction against willing licensees of its SEPs 
amounted to abuse. The FTC never reached an official ruling, since Google, 
Motorola’s parent company, settled out of court. However, the FTC were only willing 
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to end its investigation after Google had agreed to enter into an agreement that would 
prohibit the company from seeking injunctions against licensees who were willing to 
pay the remuneration according to FRAND terms.  
 
The willingness of the FTC to take such a determined stance might seem very 
uncharacteristic in comparison to the American judiciary’s per-se legality stance in 
traditional antitrust cases of compulsory licensing of IPR. One possible explanation 
for the difference in approach could be that because the IPR is governed by a SSO 
with whom the undertaking has already contracted, the order is not seen as forcing an 
undertaking to deal. Instead, it is forcing an undertaking to make good a contractual 
agreement. This is evidenced in the case of In re Innovatio, where the court 
specifically held that where an undertaking has made a commitment to a SSO to 
license on FRAND terms it will constitute a ‘binding contract between the SEP 
holder, the SSO, and its members’.134 The court further held that to seek injunctive 
relief in such circumstances would violate the duty of good faith.135 In other words, in 
these cases, the compulsory license order is made to honour rudimentary contract law 
principles rather than that of competition law policy.136 This could be seen in 
Motorola, where the FTC emphasized that they could not allow Motorola to behave in 
this manner as ‘[s]eeking an injunction would be a violation of the party’s 
commitment to FRAND licensing’.137 From such a standpoint, these cases are much 
less politically contentious than the traditional compulsory license cases.  
 
A cautious observation seems to indicate that, where the IPR involves a refusal to deal 
a SEP, the American competition authority is more willing to order a compulsory 
license.  
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4.6.	  Summary	  of	  the	  American	  Stance	  
Based on a reading of the previous cases discussed, there are a few traits that the 
majority of the cases had in common. From this it can be deduced that there is a 
vague legal test with respect to a unilateral refusal to deal with IPR:138 
 
1. It seems that where a dominant undertaking unilaterally refuses to deal and 
excludes without valid business justifications, such behaviour will violate the 
Sherman Act.  
2. While Essential Facilities might be applicable to unilateral refusals to deal in 
tangible properties, it will not apply to IPR.   
3. Lack of business justification can be established upon the proof that the 
dominant undertaking had anticompetitive intent. However, excluding the 
competitor from their IPR is in itself a presumptively valid business 
justification. In turn, this grants near immunity for IPR in relation to unilateral 
refusal to deal.  
 
A certain ambiguity remains as to when there is anticompetitive intent and whether 
that will trump the IPR owner’s right to exclude as a valid business justification.   
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5.	  A	  COMPARATIVE	  ANALYSIS	  	  
By now, it is that the American judiciary’s inclination to enforce compulsory 
licensing based on antitrust policy is much more restrictive than its European 
counterpart. Furthermore, the legal test outlining the circumstances where the 
American judiciary is willing to make such an order is far less clear than the 
corresponding EU test. The American case law is scattered and contradictory, a state 
that is particularly evident when comparing Xerox and Kodak. Furthermore, while 
several American cases have addressed this legal area, so far they have been dealt 
with by lower courts and there have been conflicting rulings. The Supreme Court has 
never ruled directly on the applicability of unilateral refusal to deal IPR in the context 
of antitrust law.139 Even when cases have touched upon such matters, the Supreme 
Court has avoided the key issue. The Supreme Court has never proposed a rigid test to 
determine what circumstances might justify a mandated order to license. As a result, 
there is not a single standard test comparable to the exceptional circumstances test as 
set out in Magill in Europe.  
5.1.	  Anticompetitive	  Intent	  and	  Disruption	  of	  Previous	  Supply	  	  
On both sides of the Atlantic, intent plays a decisive role in inferring whether the 
dominant undertaking has committed abuse by refusing to deal. However, the 
emphasis the two systems have put on intent varies widely. In America, intent has 
often been the persuasive factor in determining whether abuse is present in the 
refusal. In Kodak, the court primarily focused on investigating the subjective intent of 
the company.140  It was the fact that Kodak had primarily used their patent as a pretext 
in order to exclude the ISOs from the secondary market which led the courts to rule 
against them. The court was particularly moved by the fact that when Kodak first filed 
the case, the company failed to raise any issues of IPR with the court. It was not until 
the case reached appeal at the Ninth Circuit that Kodak first decided to argue that, as 
patent holders, they had discretion not to license their patents and their refusal to sell 
patented parts could not be contrary to section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Ninth 
Circuit interpreted this behaviour as a sign that Kodak ‘was not even thinking about 
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its patent rights’.141 The Ninth Circuit then went on to state that neither ‘[i]ntellectual 
property law or the antitrust laws justify allowing a monopolist to rely upon a 
pretextual business justification to mask anticompetition conduct’.142 Kodak is one of 
the rare cases in which the American courts have been willing to find that refusal to 
deal of an IPR is abusive under antitrust policy. Since the deciding factor of the case 
relied on the intent of the companies, it is fair to assume that this indicates that 
American courts put great importance on intent for there to be any possibility of a 
finding of abuse.  
 
The importance American courts place on intent can be further demonstrated by cases 
where disruption of prior supply has taken place.143 This line of cases seems to be 
where even the most conservative of American judges are willing to find that a 
potential abuse under section 2 of the Sherman Act has occurred.144 This is evident in 
Trinko, where Justice Scalia differentiated the case from the outcome of Aspen. The 
honourable justice put emphasis on the fact that Verizon had not previously disrupted 
the level of supply to an already existing costumer. In particular, Justice Scalia 
explained that because of the existence of the Telecommunications Act, Verizon’s 
dealings with AT&T were never voluntary, as in that of Aspen. Where the dealings 
had been voluntarily entered into and were profitable for both parties involved, as in 
the fact of Aspen, it made no business sense as to why an undertaking would cease to 
deal. The only logical explanation would therefore be that the dominant undertaking 
was willing to sustain short-term loss by refusal to supply since this would exclude 
the competition from the market in the future. Such a strategy would allow the 
dominant undertaking to reserve future monopolistic earnings, which would be 
larger.145 Since this factual scenario was not present in Trinko, ‘anticompetitive 
malice’ could not be inferred from Verizon’s actions in the same manner as that 
present in Aspen.146 The emphasis on ‘malice’ suggests that the Supreme Court places 
importance on intent.  
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The willingness of American courts to find abuse in disruption of earlier supply is 
largely due to the fact that such cases lend themselves to a finding of anticompetitive 
intentions of the dominant undertaking. There is an embedded implication that if the 
dominant undertaking had previously been happy to deal, unless objective reasoning 
for the disruption can be given, such disruption has the intent to unfairly exclude 
competitors.147  
 
In Europe, there is similar case law which indicate that, where previous supply has 
been disrupted, the courts will be keener to find abuse. This was seen in both 
Commercial Solvents and Telemarketing, where both dominant undertakings had been 
in a business relationship with the claimant. In both cases the dominant undertaking 
supplied the competing party with raw materials until they abruptly ceased such 
supply. However, this is where the similarities end and differences appear. From a 
European perspective, in Commercial Solvents and Telemarketing, the Commission 
accepted that the existence of previous supply is ‘of interest when assessing instances 
of refusal to supply’.148 However, the court found that such a factor is not a necessary 
condition for finding abuse of a dominant position, but merely a relevant factor.149 In 
regards to finding abuse in refusal to deal cases, the European Courts seem to have 
consigned ‘intent’ and the existence of a previous relationship as an indicative, but 
not determinative factor. In America on the other hand, intent is determinative.  
 
The importance of intent is further indicated in the case of Microsoft. The case has 
stronger relevance to refusal to license IPR since it involved software with strong IP 
elements. In its legal analysis of Microsoft, one point of contention that the 
Commission had in its investigation was that Microsoft and Sun systems had previous 
dealings. Microsoft had in the past always disclosed the required information to 
enable interoperability with Sun Systems but stopped when it desired to market its 
own product.150 In Microsoft, the Commission took note of this factor, but it was not 
the focal argument that the Commission relied on to make the finding of abusive 
behaviour contrary to article 102 TFEU. The Commission primarily focused on the 
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effect that the refusal would have on the industry. When the case reached the GC, the 
GC reformulated the legal justification of the case to fit the requirements in Magill in 
order to justify the findings of abuse. Intent, while considered, was not the persuasive 
factor for either the Commission or the GC when making the ruling. It has been 
suggested that, had the case been placed before an American Court, cessation of 
previous supply would have been a more persuasive factor in the determination of the 
case.151  
 
The most pertinent difference regarding intent is that US courts accept that the right 
granted by IPR to exclude competitors qualifies as objective justification, even when 
harmful anticompetitive effects have materialized. European courts do not share this 
view. The GC recognized in Microsoft that such a stance would mean that refusal to 
license would never be capable of constituting abuse of article TFEU 102. Such a 
stance would grant near immunity from antitrust scrutiny,152 which is precisely what 
happened in the US in the case of Xerox. There, the court stated that, even in the face 
of anticompetitive effects, abuse could only be found where a sham had been 
committed.153 The stance held by the two jurisdictions regarding intent on this matter 
is on opposite sides of the spectrum.  
 
The intent-based stance makes logical sense when it is considered that, in the US, 
courts have criminal and civil penalties at their disposal to punish dominant 
undertakings that abuse their position.154 Thus the difference in method can be 
attributed to a difference in philosophy. The US is keener on deterring bad behaviour 
through punishment, which is why it relies heavily on intent. The main goal of the EU 
is to encourage market harmonisation within the community, by correcting market 
failures through competition law.155 Because the goal in EU is to correct market 
dynamics, intent is not of utmost importance.  
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5.2.	  The	  Essential	  Facilities	  Doctrine	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  
refusal	  to	  license	  IPR	  cases	  
In America, the legal stance after Trinko is that the essential facilities doctrine is not 
formally recognized. It has been suggested that the same could arguably be said for 
the doctrine’s position in EU law.156 However, while none of the three major cases on 
refusal to license explicitly invoked the essential facilities doctrine by name, the 
elements underlying the Magill/IMS Health’s test strongly echoes the sentiment 
behind the essential facilities doctrine.  
 
When comparing the two jurisdictions, the EU judiciary has been more eager to apply 
the principles of the essential facilities doctrine in relation to refusal to deal in IPR. 
While Magill is primarily a market leveraging case, in that the defendant tried to 
extend its IPR into a secondary market, it also contains strong elements of the 
essential facilities doctrine. It is clear from the facts that the necessary legal factors 
existed in the case. Firstly, the information contained in the television listing 
schedules could be considered raw material akin to the chemicals in Chemical 
Solvent. The listing information was raw material in the sense that it had to be 
processed in order to make the final product of weekly TV Guides. Furthermore, the 
information could not be reasonably duplicated by the claimant as the copyright 
protection prevented them from legally doing so without RTE’s consent. Therefore, it 
is clear that the information amounted to ‘indispensable’ as required by the essential 
facilities doctrine.  
 
In Magill and IMS Health, the wording in the judgment lends itself to comparisons 
with the essential facilities doctrine. Particularly, AG Jacob’s opinion in Bronner 
explicitly commentated that principles of the essential facilities doctrine will apply in 
relation to cases that concern a refusal to license IPR.157 Consequently, while courts 
might not have explicitly invoked the doctrine by name in refusal to license IPR 
cases, it is clear that the core spirit of the doctrine heavily influenced the legal 
exceptional circumstances test of Magill/IMS Health 
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The essential facilities doctrine has been met with much less enthusiasm in America. 
One of the most famous criticisms, as worded by Areeda and quoted by the Supreme 
Court in several cases, is that it is ‘less a doctrine than an epithet, indicating some 
exception to the right to keep one’s creations to oneself, but not telling us what those 
exceptions are’. This, coupled with the decision in Trinko where the Supreme Court 
stated that it has never recognized the essential facilities doctrine, illustrates the 
cynicism of the American judiciary. 
 
In America, a grant of access based on the essential facilities doctrine is usually 
limited to cases where the facility has developed as a result of being publicly funded 
in a formerly nationalized industry;158 or alternatively, where the monopoly was a 
result of natural or geographical conditions. In such situations, the monopoly that 
these undertakings have acquired is not a result of their own hard labour or economic 
astuteness, unlike IPR. Courts usually see monopolies of this kind as being 
undeserved. However, a dominant position in the market that has been gained through 
the grant of an IPR has generally been ‘less susceptible to essential facilities 
analysis’.159 In this context, such dominance is usually seen as a monopoly position 
gained through ‘superior skill, foresight and industry’ and, more deserved.160  
 
A grant of license is therefore much more likely in the former scenario and can be 
evidenced by a longstanding line of case law. It begins with the Terminal Railroad161 
case, where the origin of the doctrine of essential facilities can first be attributed. At 
the time of the case, there existed only one railroad track across the Mississippi river 
that enabled the passage of trains into St. Louis. The defendant, a coalition of railroad 
companies that owned the track, had refused to grant competitors access to the bridge. 
The Court found that the monopoly was not earned through skill or effort but 
convenient geographical location.162 Consequently the court required the company to 
grant competing railroads access to the bridge. Other cases where similarly favourable 
rulings have been found based on the essential facilities doctrine concerned formerly 
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government subsidized facilities, natural monopolies in the form of mountains,163 or 
industries where access is of political interest to the public. 164  Since natural 
monopolies and government sanctioned developments are rarer in relation to IPR and 
occur more often for tangible property, this could partly explain why the doctrine has 
yet to be successfully argued in relation to IPR in the US.  
 
While the abovementioned explanation makes sense, this can only partly explain the 
American position. Europe has also been amenable to considerations of natural 
monopolies and government sanctions. This was evidenced by cases such as Sea 
Containers where the European Commission encouraged the dominant undertaking to 
allow competitors to use their seaports. However, the difference is that the European 
Courts, unlike American courts, have still been susceptible to arguments embedded in 
the essential facilities doctrine for cases where elements of geographical or 
nationalized monopolies did not exist. In particular, European Courts have been 
prepared to apply the essential facilities doctrine to cases revolving IPR such as 
Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft. Therefore, American courts’ refusal to grant 
license to IPR because such monopolies are more deserving than geographical or 
former nationalized monopolies cannot explain the difference in the position taken by 
the two jurisdictions. Such considerations also exist for European courts, yet the latter 
still reached a different legal development. It is posited by the author, that a better 
explanation for the US’ courts’ hesitation in using the doctrine in relation to IPR is 
that American courts prefer to base their legal analysis upon intent.165  
 
The US stance in relation to IPR and market dynamics is one of non-interference. The 
essential facilities doctrine is heavily grounded upon the belief that competition law 
needs to interfere in order to restore market balance by allowing competitors access in 
order to compete on a secondary market. It is not surprising that this does not fit into 
the American judiciary’s traditional agenda. An intent based approach, focusing on 
wrongdoing of the dominant undertaking rather than a legal justification of “restoring 
market balance” suits the American narrative better. Applying the essential facilities 
doctrine would make the court susceptible to criticism that the judiciary is 
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overstepping their competence. This is because the doctrine requires them to make a 
judgment regarding economic policy.166 Such an analysis can be seen as highly 
political in nature, and many have argued that judgments of this nature are more 
suitable for a legislative body.167 Arguably it can be suggested that the American 
courts have been keen to focus on intent in these cases since such legal analysis is less 
politicized. This theory would better explain the two jurisdictions’ contrasting 
approaches to compulsory licensing in competition law. One academic regarded the 
development of the essential facilities doctrine in Europe as proof of the EU’s desire 
to break up dominance of private firms.168 The European Court in comparison to the 
American judiciary is more willing to interfere with competition in order to restore 
market balance.169 The emphasis of the legal analysis by European Courts is often 
placed on what effect the dominant undertaking’s refusal will have on the market. In 
particular, courts will consider whether the net benefits to consumer welfare will be 
enhanced by access to the IPR, or whether allowing IPR owners to exclude 
competition will improve innovation to such an extent that the net benefits will 
outweigh the negative effects of their refusal.170  
 
The focus on the effect that refusals will have on markets is perhaps why the 
European jurisdiction has been more persuaded by the arguments of indispensability, 
which are embedded in the essential facilities doctrine. Intent and disruption of 
previous supply have been relegated to a secondary concern. In contrast to the United 
States, it is not a necessary element in finding abuse due to refusal to supply. It has 
even been argued that should Commercial Solvents have come up in court today, it 
would have been decided on principles closer to the line of cases such as Bronner and 
principles akin to essential facilities doctrines.171 Indeed, Commercial Solvents did 
mention that the raw material in the facts of the case were ‘indispensable’ to 
competitors in a secondary market. Commercial Solvents also mentioned the risk of 
the refusal being capable of ‘eliminating all competition’. Both terms are language 
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that is highly distinctive of the essential facilities doctrine. Consequently, it seems 
that the main cause for the different rulings in the two legal jurisdictions is that they 
draw from different justifications to rationalize the rulings. The EU focuses on 
theoretical reasoning that is strongly grounded in principles that stem from the 
essential facilities doctrine, whereas the US avoids this in preference to arguments of 
intent, in the rare cases where the US courts are willing to find abuse.  
5.3.	  History	  regarding	  IPR	  
The inconsistencies between the American and European jurisdictions’ stance towards 
mandating licensing of IPR within antitrust could possibly be traced to the historical 
and cultural differences in the judicial structure of the two continents.  
 
A common phrase that seems to be beloved of American legal academics is that they 
believe the EU judiciary has a ‘history of hostility’ towards IPR.172 Even outside the 
context of compulsory licensing of IPR, the European judiciary’s hostility can be seen 
where IPR is used to restrict trade within the EU. Where nationally granted IPR 
threatened to upset the fundamental principles of freedom of movement and 
restriction of markets in the Community, the European Courts have shown little 
hesitation in curbing IPR in order to preserve the integrity of such principles. One 
notorious example being Grundig,173 where trademark rights were curbed when a 
German manufacturer of household machines granted exclusive dealership rights to a 
subsidiary in France. Similar curtailing of the protection of IPR was also made in 
Centrafarm 174  regarding patents, and Deutsche Grammophon, with respect to 
copyrights.175  
 
A widely repeated criticism of the EU, is that in the jurisdiction’s history of case law 
regarding compulsory licensing, two out of three petitioners have so far been granted 
the compulsory license they sought from a dominant undertaking by the European 
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Courts.176 This argument is skewed and fails to take account of the bigger picture. 
Against a background timespan of over three decades, there has only been a handful 
of petitioners.177 Furthermore, it has been rightly pointed out that the ECJ probably 
waited for a case where the facts were straightforward enough to lean towards the 
finding of justifying a mandatory licensing, in order to avoid controversy.178  
 
The American judiciary on the other hand has at times shown an almost reckless 
deference to IPR owners’ right to exclude, to the detriment of competition law. In 
Continental Paper Bag,179 a company named Easter Paper Bag held a patent in a 
paper-bag manufacturing contraption that they never made commercial use of. The 
machine was never put into production, nor did they license the patent for the 
machine to any third parties. This led to an eventual dispute when the company, 
Continental Paper Bag, built a similar contraption as described in Eastern Paper Bag’s 
patent. Eastern Paper Bag then sued them for infringement. The defendant lodged the 
defence that due to Eastern Paper Bag’s non-use of the patent, it was clear that the 
sole purpose of the patent was to shut out competitors. The Supreme Court did not 
agree with the defence, and stated that such ‘exclusion may be said to have been of 
the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any 
owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive’.180  
 
As previously stated, IPR owners have, as a general rule, no duty to make allowances 
for their competitors in the market. They are allowed to exclude competitors. 
However, this right should not be taken to such an extent that it allows IPR owners to 
‘unreasonably sit on their intellectual property in order to stifle enterprise and prevent 
the emergence of new forms of competition’.181 Such a stance would ultimately hurt 
innovation, which the grant of exclusion within IPR was supposed to encourage. It 
would also be contrary to the ultimate reason for granting protection to IPR in the first 
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place, as it would hurt consumer welfare in the long run. Paradoxically, this is 
precisely what happened in Continental paper bag. The stance taken by the court 
encourages dominant undertakings to herd patents as an asset, in order to shut out 
potential future competitors without contributing anything new to the market.  
5.4.	  The	  Competence	  of	  Courts	  to	  Internally	  monitor	  IPR	  	  
Some have interpreted the difference in attitude regarding compulsory licensing 
between the European and American Court to be attributed to the structural difference 
in the regulatory governance of IPR. In particular, such academics have placed 
importance on the dissimilarity as to how the competence of the court is divided in the 
different legal regimes. It is questioned whether the difference lie in the fact that 
American courts are not limited within their geographical jurisdiction, whereas the 
European courts are, and have no power to revoke member state granted IPR. This 
theory is of particular interest considering the future prospects of a unitary patent that 
is likely to be implemented in Europe in the near future. If the difference in structure 
does indeed explain the different approaches, this might mean that the divergences in 
the judicial systems will diminish once the unified patent initiative is in force.  
 
Many legal scholars have made their own interpretations of the current case law on 
compulsory license orders. They contend that the main underlying rationale of the 
European Courts for finding such an obligation occurs when the merit of the IPR is 
weak.182 The theory is that since European Courts have no power to revoke IPR 
granted by member states, to circumvent this, mandatory license orders are used 
against the IPR owner where the IPR is undeserving of protection.183 In support of 
this conjecture, it is often remarked on that in Magill, the copyright in question 
regarded TV-listing. As previously noted, no other member state within the European 
Union would grant intellectual property protection for such information. There was 
therefore a member wide consensus that such information was undeserving of 
protection. Similarly, the rights involved in IMS Health might not have been 
deserving of copyright protection either. The brick structure was essentially 
categorized postcodes with little artistic merit. AG Jacobs hinted at sentiments of this 
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sort when he highlighted ‘the dubious nature of the IPR at stake’184 in Magill as a 
factor that tipped the balance in favour of mandating an obligation to license.  
 
It is worth comparing the European Courts with their American counterpart, in this 
regard. American courts, such as the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, have the 
power to question the merit of an IPR even where it has already been granted. If the 
courts find that the IPR lacks merit, they have full discretion to cancel the protection 
altogether. Some academics have attributed American courts’ hesitance to use 
competition law to curb IPR as a result of there being a system of governance that 
allows them to internally restrict IPR.185 This can be illustrated by the case of Feist 
Publications.186 In this case, Rural Telephone Service was a dominant company that 
published telephone directory books exclusively in parts of Kansas. A competing 
publisher requested authorised use over Rural’s listing in order to publish its own 
independent comprehensive phone directory, but was rejected. As a result, Rural sued 
for copyright infringement when they became aware that Feist had gone ahead and 
copied their listings without permission. In response to the suit, Feist lodged the 
defence that Rural’s refusal violated section 2 of the Sherman act. Interestingly, the 
court made a ruling that allowed Feist to use the listing, by finding that there was no 
underlying copyright protection in the listing. Since the property was not protected by 
IPR, Rural had no exclusive rights to prevent Feist from using such listings.  
 
It could be useful here to draw certain parallels to the facts of Magill. Such an analogy 
can highlight how different the methods employed by the courts in the two 
jurisdictions are, even where the courts are dealing with factually similar scenarios.187 
In both Feist Publications and Magill, the copyrighted work was collected 
information published in the format of listings. In both cases, the information retained 
by the dominant undertaking was necessary for the claimant to produce their own new 
product. Feist Publications contained the necessary elements to enable the court to 
make an order for a mandatory license under the essential facilities doctrine, had the 
court desired to do so.188 The crucial factors that determined Magill were also present 
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in the case of Feist Publications. However, the court’s reaction was decidedly 
different from the ECJ’s ruling in Magill. While the final result in both cases was that 
the petitioner was allowed to use the relevant asset,189 the Supreme Court did not 
mandate that Rural should license their listings in Feist Publications. Instead the court 
voided Rural’s copyright protection. Unlike the ECJ, the Supreme Court has power to 
determine the merits of IPR. The Supreme Court therefore reasoned that information 
in the form of telephone listings did not meet the preliminary requirement for 
copyright protection, that the work must be original, and hold a minimal threshold of 
creativity. Since the listings should not have been considered as copyrighted, Feist 
had not infringed any IPR by using the information to produce their phone directory. 
Put simply, the Supreme Court made use of principles of IPR rather than competition 
law to allow Feist access to the asset.  
 
It should be remembered that European Courts do not have power to interfere with 
IPR already granted by member states. Thus, the method employed by the Supreme 
Court in Feist Publications was not a viable option for the ECJ in Magill. Academics 
have therefore suggested that compulsory licensing is a convenient tool for European 
courts to circumvent this lack of power in intellectual property law.190 The use of 
competition law compensates for European courts’ lack of jurisdiction, and enables 
them to curb IPR which they consider to be of weak merit.191 While this is a popular 
theory it has flaws. Nowhere in the exceptional circumstances test, as espoused by the 
ECJ, in either Magill or its further development in IMS Health does the test mention 
any criteria that examines the strength of the IPR.192 Nor was there any mention in 
either the Commission’s investigation, or the GC of the strength or merit of the IPR 
held by Microsoft. AG Jacobs made comments regarding the weak merits of the IPR 
in Magill in Bronner, where he pointed out that the copyright protection involved 
‘was difficult to justify in terms of rewarding or providing an incentive for creative 
effort’.193 Even so, such comments are merely suggestive and not legally binding. The 
problematic aspect of subscribing to this theory is that it suggests that the ECJ would 
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purposely act outside its conferred competence.194 Even if the IPR in question have 
weak merits, it is not for the ECJ or any European Legal Court to try to curb any 
previously granted protection. When the IPR in question has not been harmonized 
within the EU, any attempt by either the Commission or the ECJ to question the 
validity of the merits of the IPR would constitute an infringement of article 345 
TFEU.195 It also confuses the issue since compulsory licensing is not an appropriate 
tool to remedy weak IPR that is not deserving of protection. This is because 
compulsory licensing as a court order does not limit the strength of an IPR. A party 
which is granted a compulsory license as a remedy still has to offer reasonable 
remuneration for the use of the IPR as consideration. Compulsory licensing should 
therefore in no way be seen as a ‘cancellation’196 of the IPR’s existence since 
remuneration is an acknowledgment of the value of the IPR’s merits. Should the IPR 
in question be undeserving of protection, the European legal authorities must refrain 
from making a compulsory licensing order. Instead it must refer the IPR back to 
national member courts for a determination of the IPR’s merit.197  
 
Therefore while it is tempting to state that the differences in the European and 
American’s courts attitude towards mandatory licensing is due to the structural 
disparities of the courts, it is not an adequate one that is based on a careful reading of 
the case law. It is therefore posited that even if there are advances in implementing a 
unitary patent system in Europe in the near future, it would most likely not impact the 
case law or legal analysis of compulsory licenses for IPR in competition law.  
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6.	  A	  MATTER	  OF	  OPINION	  –	  WHICH	  IS	  BETTER?	  
6.1.	  Incentive	  to	  Innovate	  versus	  Protecting	  the	  Competition	  
Market	  
The main fear in using anticompetition policies to curb IPR is that it would reduce the 
incentive for companies to innovate. According to this widely accepted theory, the 
‘quintessential engine of innovation’ is an IPR owner’s right to exclude others, in 
particular competitors’ from using their intellectual property.198 The theory originates 
from the idea that research and development that goes into the creation process of an 
intellectual property, is costly. If the innovator is not granted compensation in the 
form of exclusion, other competitors could swoop in and co-opt their costly initial 
investment by duplicating the finished product. This is what is most commonly 
known as ‘free-riding’.199 The fear is that if IPR owners would no longer be able to 
exercise IPR owners’ rights to exclude other parties from using their property without 
permission, innovation would decrease. Innovators would worry about other 
competitors trying to free ride on their innovative efforts. Conversely, competitors 
would decline to innovate in the hopes that they get to free ride on prior innovation 
without much effort on their part.200  
 
It is admitted that removing an IPR owner’s right to exclude would certainly have a 
certain disincentive effect on innovation. The problem is that the American approach 
puts too much emphasis on preserving the IPR owner’s granted protection without 
taking account of other considerations. The current legal stance is that IPR owners are 
insulated from any competition law scrutiny in relation to abuse for refusal to deal. 
This is most evident in Data General where the US court stressed that the right to 
exclude in IPR is per-se legal, even if such exclusion led to extraordinary 
circumstances that would cause harm to consumers.201 This is a cause for concern as 
the underlying justification for IPR should be to maximize consumer welfare.  
 
                                                
198	  Ariel	  Ezrachi	  and	  Mariateresa	  Maggiolino,	  ‘European	  Competition	  Law,	  Compulsory	  Licensing,	  and	  
Innovation’	  [2012]	  8(3)	  Journal	  of	  Competition	  Law	  &	  economics	  596.	  	  
199	  Daniel	  F.	  Spulber,	  ‘Competition	  Policy	  and	  the	  Incentive	  to	  innovate:	  The	  Dynamic	  Effects	  of	  
Microsoft	  v	  Commission’	  [2008]	  25(2)	  Yale	  Journal	  on	  Regulation	  101,	  126	  
200	  ibid.	  	  
201	  Data	  General,	  paragraph	  1187.	  
 59 
There are several flaws in not allowing compulsory licensing due to its potential 
disincentive effects. Firstly, it must be remembered that the protection afforded to 
intellectual property has never been an unlimited. On both sides of the Atlantic, 
general limitation principles on IPR have always applied. Consider the doctrine of 
first sale in this regard. The first sale doctrine allows a lawful owner to make a copy 
of the IPR product, or to resell the product in question as well as transfer or even 
destroy it without obtaining permission from the original inventor. Such a restriction 
on IPR exists in nearly every legal jurisdiction with a developed IPR system. 
Furthermore, even though such limitations might have similar disincentive effects on 
innovation, legal jurisdictions still uphold them, as it is deemed necessary in order to 
ensure that IPR owners are not overcompensated for their innovation.202  
 
Another exemption that undermines the supposition that owner’s rights to infringe 
cannot be curbed for the purpose of enhancing innovation is experimental use. 
Generally, this principle allows for a defence where patent infringement would 
normally be found, but the unauthorized use of the patent was for purposes that could 
be construed for experimental or research purposes. This defence is recognized in 
both continents to various degrees.203 Analogous to compulsory licensing, the defence 
allows third parties unauthorized use of their patents. Some legal academics consider 
compulsory licensing as ‘heresy’204 with respect to the principles of intellectual 
property law because it would limit IPR owner’s rights of exclusion. But it is arguably 
an extreme viewpoint. While experimental use does grant access to patents, one 
fundamental difference from compulsory licensing is that where the patent infringer 
commercializes their use and make a profit, the defence will not apply. This meant 
that such a defence is useless for anticompetition purposes since competitors desiring 
access are seeking to commercialize their products. Therefore, the defence is mostly 
relevant for Universities and hobbyists who use patented inventions purely for 
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research and non-commercial purposes.205 One point of relevance is that the rationale 
for experimental use is to correct a situation in which the net effect of the exclusive 
rights in patents would restrict rather than enhance innovation.206 Thus, it is posited 
that a parallel can be drawn here with compulsory licensing in competition law. 
Where granted access would serve to increase more innovation than it inhibits, 
consideration needs to be made as to whether a license order should be granted.  
 
In Europe, the central focus for finding abuse in competition law is that the refusal 
can only amount to illegality when consumers are harmed. Consequently, there should 
only be a duty to deal if such a duty would encourage more competition than it would 
discourage.207 It is posited that the stance of near immunity in the US is unable to 
properly consider such factors. In particular, it fails to properly address three 
troublesome scenarios where IPR owners will be so overcompensated for their 
original contribution that the exclusion of competitors cannot be justified.   
 
IPR extended beyond its market 
It is interesting to consider Xerox and Kodak in this regard. In both cases, the 
potentially offending party had banned ISOs from using their IPR protected 
replacement parts. Xerox and Kodak were granted the patent for the production of 
such parts for the main market of producing photocopiers. In the secondary market of 
service and maintenance, such patents were only incidental. The ISOs did not desire 
to duplicate the patented parts, but only required to incorporate them for end user’s 
needs in the repair service. By restricting access to replacement parts, Xerox and 
Kodak monopolized a secondary market and foreclosed it to its competitors, securing 
‘a market that was unrelated to its intellectual property, using means that had nothing 
to do with the reward it was legally entitled to secure’.208  
 
IPR should be afforded special protection from the antitrust law when the refusal 
merely denies access to its intellectual property. However, in situations such as Kodak 
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and Xerox, this will not be the case. Instead, it is the end users who will be using the 
intellectual property rather than the ISOs.209 Therefore, by affording IPR owners 
extensive protection beyond the original market intended by the grant of the patent, it 
is not only competitors on the markets who will be detrimentally affected, but also the 
consumers.  
 
IPR as a building block for new inventions 
Where the IPR in question is a raw material needed for the development of further 
invention or a new product, allowing the owner to unduly restrict access can create a 
bottleneck for further invention. This could be observed in Magill where the 
copyrighted information held by RTE was needed by Magill in order to create a new 
product. Here the European Court rightly granted Magill a licensing right in order to 
further innovation in the market. By contrast, consider the American stance, which 
effectively overcompensates the IPR owner since they are now able to deny 
competitors access to the required information that could serve as ‘building blocks for 
further progress’.210 This creates a situation where the granted IPR protection has the 
unintended consequences of hampering innovation rather than encouraging it.  
 
IPR with network effects 
The underlying assumption that preservation of IPR will lead to dynamic competition 
simply does not apply with regards to external market failures caused by factors that 
are outside the intellectual property law framework.211 In some circumstances, the 
product that incorporates the patent gains such dominance that it becomes an industry 
standard. When a product reaches such a status it generates network effects, 212 which 
in turn create reliance by consumers upon the product, making them unwilling to 
switch away from the product. Once this occurs, the protection granted by the IPR 
will exceed the optimal balance of what would have been necessary to reward and 
encourage the innovation in question.213 This scenario could be seen in both IMS 
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Health and Microsoft, where the brick structure and the operating system respectively 
had become an entrenched industry standard that consumers had become dependent 
upon and refused to switch away from. Such network effects create a high barrier of 
entry to the market for prospective competitors.214  
 
In all the three abovementioned scenarios, a stance of near immunity, as taken by the 
American judiciary, would only serve to overcompensate the IPR owner beyond what 
was originally intended by intellectual property law. In these situations, turning to 
internal intellectual property law regulations fails to remedy the negative effects 
created on the market by IPR.215 This is because the issues created in these scenarios 
are entirely unrelated to the strength of the IPR in itself.216 Therefore, removing the 
protection of IPR would be inappropriate, as the merit of the underlying IPR does not 
need to be weak in the abovementioned scenarios for the market failure to arise. Thus, 
turning to intellectual property law cannot correct the market failure that has arisen. 
This is a role that is better suited for competition law. Competition law would not 
scrutinize the merit of the IPR, which might very well be valid, but rather whether the 
manner in which the IPR is used by its owner produces anticompetitive effects on the 
market. Such a legal analysis would serve to better correct the market failure that 
arises in the abovementioned scenarios.  
  
By comparison, consider the European approach in the abovementioned scenarios, in 
particular, the ‘new product rule’ and requirement that a secondary market needs to 
exist for an obligation to license to arise. This rule serves to protect IPR owners where 
the effect of their refusal only excludes competitors that try to compete by duplicating 
the original owner’s efforts. Yet, at the same time it ensures that the IPR holders’ 
right to exclude is constrained where it acts as a bottleneck to prevent the 
development of new technology that could lead to products that would substitute the 
product currently protected by the IPR.217 Consequently, IPR owners cannot exert 
their dominant influence to prevent competition in a downstream market that would 
lead to better consumer welfare. Certain critics have found issues with the European 
law in this area after Microsoft, accusing the case of diluting the requirement of new 
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products by allowing improvements to fulfil the criteria. Nevertheless, it is posited 
that this a sound move. This is because a completely new product rule makes sense in 
the context where it is the IPR in itself that excludes the competitor from placing a 
completely new product on the market such as in the case of Magill. Conversely, in 
situations where the impossibility of launching a new or better product is caused by 
external failures due to network effects in the market as in the facts of IMS Health, 
requiring a completely new product will not restore dynamic competition to the 
market.218 The new stance in Microsoft allows the court some leeway in situations 
where the product might not be entirely new but contributes to a net benefit for 
consumer welfare through improved technology or new characteristics.  
6.3.	  Common	  Criticism	  of	  the	  EU	  System	  
There has been much criticism amongst legal scholars regarding the EU’s stance on 
granting compulsory licenses based on competition law. One particularly harsh 
academic likened the way that the ECJ ordered a mandatory licensing in IMS Health 
as punishing the company for their own success.219 This is a criticism that has been 
leveraged at the essential facilities doctrine as a whole when used in regards to IPR. 
The argument is that access to an essential facility is most likely to be ordered when 
the invention is unique, valuable, and difficult to duplicate. Inventions fulfilling those 
criteria are the ones that are most deserving of protection. Evidently, it is ‘inherently 
inconsistent with IP protection’.220  However, as previously mentioned, granting a 
mandatory license in Europe will only occur when the petitioner operates in a 
secondary market. This means that the IPR owners are free to exclude competitors in 
the primary market, since this is what the grant of intellectual law was intended to 
protect. The courts make an important distinction between the legitimate competitive 
advantages that IPR owners are lawfully allowed to retain to themselves in a single 
market situation, as opposed to two market scenarios where it is not. 221  In the latter, 
the actions of an IPR owner that extend exclusive control over a distinct secondary 
market are unjustifiable both from a competition law perspective and intellectual 
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property law perspective. In intellectual property law, the original grant of protection 
was only awarded with the primary market in mind. From a competition law 
standpoint, there are no pro-competitive advantages, as the effect of the dominant 
undertakings actions in the secondary market would only serve to shut out 
competitors that are trying to offer better and cheaper products in the downstream 
market. The competitors would not be trying to offer such products on their own. The 
net effect is that there is more consumer harm than pro-competitive benefits.222 The 
EU legal test as derived from Magill/IMS Health ensures that there are adequate 
limiting factors that will not burden dominant undertakings more than is necessary in 
order to ensure that an optimal pro-competitive outcome will be reached.    
 
Alternatively, critics have also contended that, slowly but surely, the ECJ’s rulings in 
Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft has contributed to the trend of gradually eroding 
the protection that was supposed to be conferred by IPR.223 The contention advanced 
by such opponents is that the test has made mandatory licensing a commonplace 
remedy for refusal to license IPR. Surely, such a view must be seen as erroneous in 
light of judicial precedence and also the lack of numbers of mandatory licenses 
granted. Here, it is important to take of note of AG Jacobs’ observation in Bronner. 
He was of the opinion that Magill was a case of special circumstance which ‘swung 
the balance in favour of an obligation to license’224. The judgments in these cases 
should in no way be interpreted as opening the floodgates for compulsory licensing. 
In retrospect, we see that this has not been the case at all. Even after Microsoft, which 
critics have accused of diluting the exceptional circumstances test to its limits, the 
legacy of the case has done little to hamper the innovation in the IT industry.    
 
In hindsight, even EU’s harshest critics have noted that the actual effect of the sparse 
compulsory licenses mandated by EU courts have not had a perceptible ‘chilling 
effect on innovation’.225 The facts of the individual cases in the EU have been 
exceptional, and not easily duplicated.226 Nearly a decade after the Microsoft case that 
supposedly widened the legal test standard set out in Magill, the floodgate has yet to 
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open. There has been no mass petitioning for compulsory licenses of IPR but only a 
handful of cases, 227  and innovation has not slowed down. None of the fears 
hypothesized by the critics have materialized. 
6.4.	  Competition	  as	  incentive	  for	  competition	  
Europe strikes a much better balance since it recognizes that competition itself can 
foster innovation.228 This is an element often forgotten by critics, but it is an 
important impetus to pressure dominant undertakings to innovate. It has been 
suggested that a monopolist will generally have much less incentive to innovate than a 
company within a competitive industry.229 When competitors exist in the market, it 
forces everyone to stay innovative in order to offer improved products, in terms of 
higher quality, lower prices, and better functions in order to attract customers.230 
When dominant undertakings have no competition they become stagnant, as they can 
rely on their monopolistic position on the market. Consumers have no other choice 
but to purchase from them, and the dominant undertaking becomes complacent 
instead of investing money and resources in innovation. Empirical studies have even 
found that competition is the main driving force of innovation in many industries.231 
Europe’s approach, which aspires to keep competition in the market in tact, might 
therefore do more for innovation than the US approach, which insulates IPR owners 
from competition. With this in mind, when European courts endeavour to preserve 
competition they do not simply limit competition by defining it as the mere existence 
of rivals on the market. Rather, they seek to protect competition that will foster an 
environment that encourages innovation, increase output, and reduces prices.232  
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It is therefore posited that, while compulsory licensing could have some disincentive 
effects on innovation, such an effect should not be considered in isolation. Instead, it 
is necessary to consider the net gain that the compulsory license could contribute in 
terms of furthering innovation, and even by stimulating more competition in the 
market as a whole. 
 
In an ideal world, IPR protection afforded to owners should only prevail to the extent 
that the detrimental effects protection does not exceed the social benefits. As rightly 
observed though, there is ‘no precise formula’ that guarantees such an outcome.233  
The formula used by European Courts primarily focuses on the effect that the refusal 
in question will have on the market. The European standpoint tends to focus on the 
whole picture, and endeavours to preserve the market structure in order to benefit 
consumer welfare. The disadvantage of such a stance is that market preservation does 
not always ensure dynamic competition and can reduce dynamic efficiency.234 
Furthermore, critics fear that overuse of interference could possibly lead to false 
positives, since such a balance judgment is notoriously hard to predict. It has been 
posited that premature interference by the courts could slow down the very 
competition that competition law is trying to protect.235 This is why the American 
judiciary have preferred a non-interventionist approach. Rather than risk making a 
wrong judgment, the American judiciary is willing to permit potential harm to 
consumers, in the hopes that market dynamics will correct itself without judicial 
interference in the long run.236 Cyril Ritter succinctly summarized the matter by 
stating that the real issue is not whether antitrust agencies are competent enough to 
make such a determination. The real question is whether ‘the risk of antitrust agencies 
erring in evaluating the need for compulsory licenses’ is so great ‘that we should 
generally prefer no compulsory licenses at all?’237 In this author’s opinion, it is not.  
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Credit must be given where credit is due. While the methodology of European Court’s 
does not always strike a right balance, the European Courts always give proper 
consideration to how consumer welfare will ultimately be affected. In these situations, 
it is a lot more appropriate to utilize competition law to correct overprotection of IPR 
since the basis of legal analysis of competition law is to make an ex-post case-by-case 
evaluation. This can adequately balance competing interests.238 This is why it is 
preferable to the US stance, which seems to lose sight of consumer welfare altogether 
in its judicial reasoning by insisting on upholding the IPR owner’s right to exclude 
even in cases where there are no benefits for consumers in either the long or short 
term.239 
6.5.	  The	  Underlying	  Flaw	  of	  the	  Incentive	  Theory	  
Often, it seems that the underlying theory of whether granting exclusive rights truly 
does improve innovation has been accepted without adequate critical scrutiny. As 
aptly put by one academic ‘Intellectual Property Rights Protection are not 
fundamental natural rights that must be protected against any encroachment for their 
own sake’.240 The purpose of a grant is to promote innovation and economic growth, 
if the overriding objective is not achieved, then the extent of protection should be up 
for scrutiny.   
 
Few, if any, academics examine the empirical evidence that shows the casual link 
between innovation and granting exclusive rights for intellectual property. In fact, the 
few studies that have been conducted in this area have often shown that the opposite 
is true.241 One study carried out by Cohen,242 suggests that the presumed strong 
correlation between patent protection and innovation is in reality, tenable at best. The 
results showed that contrary to traditional dogma, IPR was seldom the main 
motivation for innovation in most industries. The research conducted showed that 
there are other more pertinent reasons for most companies to innovate. One of the 
primary incentives to innovative was the ability to stay ahead of competitors in the 
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market. 243 Market competition is not stagnant, and a company needs to constantly 
innovate and produce new products to attract consumers in order to maintain their 
position. Even where IPR owners are granted exclusion, it is not uncommon for 
competitors to invent around the IPR to achieve a similar if not improved result. 
 
The narrowness of only considering IPR protection as the sole reason for innovation 
ignores the commercial reality that patents are often procured for reasons other than 
gaining direct profits from commercializing their inventions in the market.244 Patents 
can be used as leverage to induce competitors to enter cross-licensing deals,245 or to 
increase the perceived value of the company’s IP portfolio.246  
 
Cohen’s conducted studies also revealed that the only industries that viewed patents 
as major incentives to innovation were firms in the pharmaceutical, agricultural, and 
chemical industries.247 Another academic who attempted to show the detrimental 
effect that mandatory licensing had on company’s decision making to innovate could 
only do so in very narrow industries. Their conducted studies showed that US 
companies would withdraw patent applications from countries that were known to 
mandate compulsory licensing out of fear that their patents would be in danger from 
such policies.248 These companies were almost without exception pharmaceuticals 
and such effects could not be found in other industries. The common factor seems to 
indicate that what effect mandatory licensing has on incentives for intellectual 
property rights is heavily dependent on the type of industry within which the IPR 
operates. The only thing this argument serves to indicate is that compulsory licensing 
might need to be more sparingly issued with regard to certain sensitive industries. It 
should not be hard to zero in on which these are as the research conducted thus far all 
reach the same conclusion; The vulnerable industries are all within pharmaceutical 
health, or relate to similar chemical patents. It is therefore, strongly suggested by this 
author that legal authorities should always make an industry specific consideration 
before considering whether to mandate an obligatory license. It is noteworthy that 
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mandatory licensing have not been ordered in any of the European cases, regarding a 
patent, in either of the aforementioned industries.249. Concluding, this indicates that 
the European approach has maintained a good balance without being too restrictive, 
as suggested by some critics, and that their policies have had a negligible effect on 
innovation at most. By comparison, the US’ stance on refraining from making 
compulsory licensing on antitrust policies in all industries therefore seems excessive. 
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7.	  CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  
7.1.	  Main	  Differences	  Between	  EU	  and	  US	  Judicial	  Approaches	  
The main difference in approaches between the American and European method, can 
be boiled down to the fact that America has primarily focused on the dominant 
undertaking’s intent in their refusal to deal. This is partly attributed to the fact that 
they have always been hesitant to apply the essential facilities doctrine, due to the fact 
that the embedded legal test requires the judiciary to make a prediction as to whether 
the dominant’s undertaking refusal will cause a net benefit or detriment to consumer 
welfare. The American Courts prefer to refrain from making such politicized 
decisions for fear of criticism. This is best shown by the fact that American courts 
have been far more willing to curb IPR owner’s exclusivity rights through means 
other than anticompetition policies. In Feist publications the court preferred to cancel 
the copyright outright instead of granting compulsory licenses on antitrust grounds. In 
cases involving SEP, such as Motorola, American courts have shown a stronger 
willingness to grant compulsory licenses. Primarily this difference seems to stem 
from the fact that they are able to justify it upon noncontroversial contract law 
principles rather than antitrust grounds. On the other hand, EU Courts are more 
willing to base their decision on competition law policies. They are primarily 
concerned with the effect that potentially abusive behaviour will have on the market 
and are less hesitant to interfere with market forces in order to improve competition 
conditions.  
7.2.	  Which	  Approach	  is	  Better?	  
Both intellectual property and competition law is designed to benefit consumer 
welfare. In this author’s opinion, it therefore makes sense that this is the standard by 
which to determine which legal jurisdiction has a better approach. From this 
perspective, it seems that the European approach is better adapted to maximizing 
consumer welfare.  
 
The primary flaw of the American approach is that a blanket refusal to grant a 
compulsory license based on antitrust policies fails to adequately reflect situations 
where protection of IPR is not optimal for consumer welfare. The near immunity 
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stance that the American judiciary has taken is essentially a policy of non-
intervention, in the belief that it is better for market dynamics to balance out any 
market failure that has resulted. However, non-intervention will not correct external 
market failures that result from situations where the IPR is being used to prevent new 
products in a secondary market, or to foreclose a competitor from a market where the 
IPR is incidental, or lastly where network effects have arisen. In all three scenarios, 
consumer harm will be caused by the dominant undertaking’s refusal to deal. Often in 
these scenarios, the net effect will be more consumer detriment than overall 
innovation gained in the market. It is therefore posited that it is only through the 
intervention of competition law that such market failures will be addressed. The 
European judiciary on the other hand, ensures that IPR is not taken to an extreme 
where exclusionary rights would be extended beyond what was originally intended 
and would result in consumer harm. Magill/IMS Health and Microsoft has constructed 
a legal test that catches all three scenarios mentioned above. In addition the 
limitations placed on the test also ensures that the measure will not become so 
commonplace that it will chill innovation in the European Community.  
 
The main defence of the American judiciary’s stance of near immunity is that to do 
otherwise would have the possible effect of discouraging innovation. However while 
some grain of truth might lie in this argument, it is also abstract in theory, with little 
empirical evidence to support it. From the discussion so far, it has been concluded 
that research indicates that innovation would only be deterred in sensitive industries 
such as pharmaceutical and chemical patents. Therefore so long as proper care and 
deliberation is exercised by the judiciary in these industries, the margin of error 
involved could be minimized.  
 
It must also be stressed that contrary to critics’ warnings, the European judiciary has 
not gone too far as previously suggested. This is abundantly clear now that some 
years have passed since the judgment in the famous cases of Magill, IMS Health and 
Microsoft, and the lack of evidence that to indicate that innovation has been more 
discouraged in Europe than to America. In light of these factors the author concludes 
that the European approach is better suited to achieve consumer welfare and that the 
legal reasoning behind the American approach is not only flawed but also based on 
factors that do not concur with factual evidence.  
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